

# The HISTORICAL BULLETIN

Vol. XXIV

MAY, 1946

No. 4

---

## VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Waldemar Gurian

## THE 1931 REVOLUTION IN SPAIN

Peter Masten Dunne

## THE POLISH INSURRECTION OF 1830

Anthony Czajkowski

## A GERMAN OUTLOOK ON HISTORY

James Collins

MAX FISCHER • JEROME G. KERWIN • CHARLES N. R. McCOY  
GEORGE G. HIGGINS • PAUL G. STEINBICKER • W. FITZGERALD

---

St. Louis University  
St. Louis 3, Mo.

\$1.00 a Year

25 cents a copy

# The HISTORICAL BULLETIN

A CATHOLIC QUARTERLY

for Teachers and Students of History

Vol. XXIV

MAY, 1946

No. 4

*Editor: JOHN F. BANNON*

*Managing Editor: JOHN M. GINSTERBLUM*

*Business Editor: WALTER E. BROWN*

*Associate Editors*

EDMUND H. HEDGES  
EDWARD J. STHOKAL  
WILLIAM H. STEINER  
DONALD R. CAMPION

WALTER H. HALLORAN  
FRANCIS J. O'BRIEN  
MARSHALL B. WINKLER  
PETER L. DANNER

*Advisory Editors*

MARTIN P. HARNEY  
THOMAS F. MAHER  
CHARLES H. METZGER

W. PATRICK DONNELLY  
PETER M. DUNNE  
GERALD G. WALSH

Published quarterly in November, January, March, and May by the Missouri Province Educational Institute, St. Louis University, St. Louis 3, Mo. Entered as second-class matter January 7, 1932 at the Post Office at St. Louis, Mo., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on January 20, 1933. Address communications to the Managing Editor or to the Business Editor, *The Historical Bulletin*, 221 North Grand Blvd., St. Louis 3, Mo. The Historical Bulletin is indexed in the Catholic Bookman and The Catholic Periodical Index.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION . . . . .	75
<i>Waldemar Gurian</i>	
THE 1931 REVOLUTION IN SPAIN . . . . .	77
<i>Peter Masten Dunne</i>	
THE POLISH INSURRECTION OF 1830 . . . . .	79
<i>Anthony Czajkowski</i>	
A GERMAN OUTLOOK ON HISTORY . . . . .	81
<i>James Collins</i>	
RECENT BOOKS IN REVIEW . . . . .	92

## CONTRIBUTORS

WALDEMAR GURIAN, PH.D., received his degree in Political Science from the University of Cologne. He is now Professor of Politics and Editor of *The Review of Politics* at the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of *Bolshevism, Theory and Practice*, *Hitler and the Christians*, *Rise and Decline of Marxism* and of other books, besides frequent contributions to periodicals.

PETER MASTEN DUNNE, S.J., PH.D., is Professor of History at the University of San Francisco. He has written: *Pioneer Jesuits in Northern Mexico*, *Pioneer Black Robes on the West Coast*, *A Padre Looks At South America*. His studies were made at the University of California.

ANTHONY CZAJKOWSKI, PH.D., received his doctorate in Mediaeval History from Fordham University. He is now Instructor in the Department of History of St. Louis University.

JAMES COLLINS, PH.D., received his degree in Philosophy from the Catholic University of America. He formerly held a Research Fellowship at Harvard University, and is now an Instructor in Philosophy at St. Louis University. He has written for *Thought*, *The New Scholasticism*, and other journals.

JEROME G. KERWIN, PH.D., (*Book Reviews*) is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

# Various Aspects of the Russian Revolution

## Waldemar Gurian

Notre Dame University

A FEW weeks before the Tsarist Regime collapsed, Vladimir Iljitsch Lenin, an exile in Switzerland, sadly remarked that the Revolution in Russia for which he was waiting, would not come in his lifetime, and that therefore he would never see his country again.\* A few months later, back in Petrograd, after the overthrow of Tsarism, he challenged publicly the view that no party was ready to assume sole power in Russia. He proclaimed bluntly that his party, the Bolshevik party, would dare to do it. In October (November) 1917, Lenin's party really took the direction of the fates of Russia in its hands. Lenin noted in the preface of his *State and Revolution*, published a few weeks later, that it is more agreeable to make revolutions than to write about them. He retained the power he had dared to seize for the few remaining years of his life, during which he became a world figure. He never regretted that he had risked action. In 1923, Lenin, a dying man, removed from public affairs, read the memoirs of a socialist, Suchanov, who severely criticized his seizure of power. He dictated the comment: "On s'engage et puis on voit." He repeated this sentence of Napoleon in order to oppose those who do not dare, who do not know how to utilize situations, who study blueprints until the golden opportunity has vanished.

But it would be wrong to regard Lenin as a man who exploited opportunities without a preconceived general plan. The development of the Russian Revolution which began as an unexpected collapse of the Tsarist Regime and received its direction from the October revolution, was determined by this plan. Lenin was not only a daring exploiter and masterful judge of situations, he was also an utopian doctrinaire, who as a disciple of Marx, believed that he had found the key to the general advance of humanity, and to the various types of society.

The ultimate and necessary aim is simple: Lenin states that in this respect, there is no difference between his beliefs and those of the anarchists. He envisages a humanity with real equality where everybody has full opportunity to develop all his capacities, where the state, as an instrument of force, will wither away, where everybody will be able to exercise all social and administrative functions. But he differs from the anarchists in believing that this aim will be reached only after a long struggle: Lenin believes that the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, the exercise of unlimited power

by the overwhelming majority led by its conscious vanguard formulating its real will, educating it to revolutionary consciousness, is necessary. This exercise of power has two decisive functions. A negative one: to destroy all opposing groups, to break up, for instance, the old machinery of the antiproletarian state, to make any resistance impossible; and a positive one: to educate the masses for the handling of administrative and social tasks. Lenin believed that with 1914, an objective possibility for the dictatorship of the proletariat had arrived. The war of nations would become a war between classes. After the downfall of Tsarism, he hoped that Russia would give at least the first signal for the universal collapse of imperialism. Lenin was not sure that the dictatorship of the proletariat established by his party in Russia would last. When this power endured beyond the days of the Parisian *Commune*, he was proud and rather surprised. Yet he believed firmly that the Soviet regime, even if it were rapidly to collapse, would evoke a myth and stimulate the world proletariat to action.

His general teaching about the dictatorship of the proletariat was supplemented by detailed views of the Russian situation. Lenin was sure that the downfall of Tsarism could not be limited to a political and constitutional change, which the liberals and social democrats regarded as creating the most advanced democracy in Russia. Such an external change was for him insufficient; he believed in a real revolution, in a total reconstruction of state and society. Such a sweeping change was necessary in order to destroy the old state machinery and to replace the old Tsarist Empire, dominated by Great Russians and created over the centuries, by free nations with the unlimited right of self-determination. These nations would be united by the common acceptance of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This sweeping change was also required in order to carry out a liberal bourgeois revolution which would overcome the backward-feudal character of Russia, and, at the same time, push forward the development towards socialism with the help of the proletarian rule by the party. Lenin realized that he had first to satisfy and to neutralize the peasants by giving them the opportunity to obtain more land, therefore apparently to secure more property for them.

After the regime had been able to last some weeks, he recognized that decrees were no longer to be formulated as examples for a future Socialist Revolution, but as Russian conditions required. He increasingly emphasized the educative aspects. "We must learn," became

\*This paper is based upon a lecture which was delivered before a seminar of the Committee on Social Thought of the University of Chicago. The author is glad to express publicly his thanks to the chairman of the Committee, Professor J. U. Nef.

his *leitmotif*. "We must learn from the experiences and achievements of capitalism. Without mastering them, nothing can be accomplished." This motive became stronger and stronger, when the expected world revolution did not materialize, when Germany did not join the Soviets after the collapse of William II's regime, when the social crises after the World War were everywhere overcome, and the Communist parties had become more or less vociferous but powerless groups of opposition. But at the same time, the unexpected happened; the Soviet regime, surrounded by a capitalistic world, lasted and grew stronger in Russia, without being supported by proletarian regimes in other countries. After the end of the civil war (in 1921-1922), Lenin realized that the most important aim was the maintenance of the Soviet regime in the midst of a hostile world. The new economic policy was introduced in order that his regime would have time to learn, to educate the masses, to improve its administration, and to recuperate. The state had not withered away; it obtained the command of economic life. The state had to be maintained in order to defend the first proletarian island against attacks threatening from outside, and then to push forward economic and social developments. That was no abandonment of the general program, but only a most important delay. The considerations of means became increasingly important, whereas the consideration of the Revolutionary aim receded. The existence of the Soviet regime, which soon became the Soviet Union, was more vital than the expectation of revolutions which did not come despite all hopes and all strenuous preparations of the Third International. Lenin's new economic policy was the foundation for the victory of Stalin's "Socialism in one country" over the permanent revolution of Trotsky.

But the general belief remained unchanged: The industrial proletariat led by the party, is destined to bring about the classless society of the future. Under Stalin, after the normalization of administrative and economic machinery, the conquest of the peasants took place. They became a part of the state machinery working for industrialization, subordinated to a general centralized plan; the number of victims did not matter. The peasants had first been neutralized (1917), then concessions had been made to them after the civil war (1921-22); now, after they had recuperated and could have become dangerous—they could have forced their will upon the state economics—they were "coordinated". The collectivization (1929-1931) took place.

The work for world revolution became increasingly a function of the foreign policies of the Soviet State. The time was past when Bolsheviks could discuss the possibility that the center of the revolution might move from Russia to another country. After 1919, the regime was obsessed by the fear of western intervention, and therefore, favored German anti-Versailles policies. Then, after 1933, it tried to use the West and its world peace machinery against the Hitler threat. Thereafter, disappointed by Munich, the USSR attempted a balance between England, France and Germany. But its attempt to remain neutral, with the help of a pact with Germany, failed. The German attack of 1941 compelled it to join the anti-Hitler front.

During all the changes after Lenin's death, Stalin

has been celebrated as the man who clarified the doctrine of the state. The state remained, according to Stalin's version, repeated by Vishinsky, even after socialism had been realized in one country. The state remained after it had become possible to grant to all citizens equal political rights and equal representation in the supreme Soviet, although a monopoly of political power was retained by the party. The state will remain necessary as long as a nonsocialistic environment does not disappear.

#### *Russia Under the New Regime*

What is the general meaning of these developments? They began with the belief in the necessity of destroying bureaucracy and army, as institutions separated from the people. They started with the abolition of ranks and titles, and they led to the rise of gigantic bureaucratic and military organizations, as well as to the restoration of ranks and titles. They were accompanied by millions of victims, by mass deportations, by incredible sacrifices and astonishing heroism, by purges and cynical betrayals, by inflexible application of a terminology which permits all dialectical adaptations in practice. They resulted in postponement of the withering away of the state for the sake of practical realities, for the necessity of maintaining power.

Looking over these developments, the observer is inclined to say that the Russian Empire's tradition has defeated, in the Soviet Union, international world revolution. True, extremely important changes have taken place. The Soviet Union has a supranational leadership consciously selected from all peoples of the USSR, and giving to all peoples the chance to advance, although Stalin has singled out great Russians for particular praise. This leadership is not an hereditary caste, but is open to everybody who accepts membership in the party. (Even negative privileges, such as, exclusion of former ruling classes, have been abandoned.) This leadership must officially accept the traditional communistic terminology which justified and steadily accompanied the rise of the regime of Lenin and Stalin. This acceptance is subordinated to the requirements of efficiency and reliability in the service of the regime. The purges of 1936-38 demonstrated that the iron power exercised over the noncommunistic masses is now exercised also inside the party. But was not the survival and re-emergence of the empire—today called Union—accomplished just by this very change in leadership? The Tsarist regime broke down because it had become inefficient in meeting the tests of war—in 1904-05, in 1914-17—and the new leaders of the Eurasian colossus are the successful heirs of those who had grown weak and decadent. Lenin was right when he announced in summer, 1917, that the Bolshevik leaders could supplant the Tsarist elites.

#### *A Positive Critique of the Revolution*

This view that the Russian revolution has not the meaning which was ascribed to it by Lenin, and is still claimed for it by the official Soviet terminology, was expressed in 1921 by a professor of law who had joined the White Russian movement in fighting the internationalist and anti-democratic Reds. While the White armies were rolling back across Siberia, Ustrialow wrote a

(Please turn to page eighty-nine)

# The Spanish Revolution of 1931

## Peter Masten Dunne, S. J.

*University of San Francisco*

THE 1931 revolution in Spain was long in the making. It sprang from dissatisfaction with the existing regime. The decline of the prestige of the Spanish monarchy had been going on steadily since the body blow it received during the Spanish American war of 1898. Queen Mother María Christina was then ruling, Alfonso XIII was but a child. At the completeness and swiftness of Spain's defeat by the rising North American power of the United States, Spanish intellectuals (writers, university professors, professional men) began to reflect upon the helplessness and corruption of their government. As Spaniards they had enjoyed a proud tradition. But in the early part of the century (the nineteenth) Spain had lost most of her American colonies, and at the end of it she lost the rest of them: Cuba, Puerto Rico, and also the Philippines. She then sold her Pacific islands to Bismarck's Germany.

After the military and naval disasters of 1898 there arose a generation of writers who were disillusioned, humiliated, and wrathful concerning their government. They are known as "the generation of 1898." Many of them lived through the revolution of 1931. Pio Baroja who is an example of them writes in his "*La Dama Errante*" (Madrid, 1916), a novel: "Spain is today a land of dreams for the decrepit, the Indians, for the broken down, for all who have no ambitions in life . . ." He mentions the war with the Yankees and reflects: "Since our army is far inferior to what we thought, and the navy has been so weak that it was annihilated without effort, why then we have been deceived in these things; it is quite possible we have been deceived in everything." Baroja was anti-clerical, anti-Semitic, and against parliamentary government. Later he wrote, "I am opposed to parliamentary government and the power of the press because they are the means whereby cattle become masters." As Ricardo León said of this generation: "They knew only how to tear down and to curse; the majority of them did not believe in God, in their country, or in themselves." Baroja showed a trait peculiar to many Spaniards: "The theory and the practical results of anarchism have a powerful fascination for him." After the failure of the Republic he believed in a "White Dictatorship."

With Spanish authors and intellectuals writing and speaking thus during the early part of the twentieth century the future did not hold bright promise for the monarchy. Failures and inefficiency during the first three decades of the century further lowered its prestige and provoked an ominous degree of restlessness. Alfonso XIII took over the government in 1902. During the first four years, fourteen political crises occurred and eight prime ministers succeeded one another. In 1906 there was an attempt to murder the royal couple; in 1909 an anti-clerical and anarchical uprising in Barcelona took place, and in 1912 Canalejas was murdered in the streets of Madrid and Canovas was assassinated.

Both had been prime ministers of the constitutional monarchy. In 1917 Spain was paralyzed by a general strike to establish a republic on the Russian model, and in 1921 occurred the colonial disaster of Anual in Africa.

The African campaigns to keep Spanish Morocco and the Riff in order had for long been unpopular. They were a waste of money and of men, and there had been vast corruption. Now Spain suffered disgrace when the Moorish tribesmen routed her army at Anual and when General Silvester committed suicide. A tide of anarchy swept over the country. Its climax was reached in the murder of the Cardinal Archbishop of Saragossa—and there was revolution. Primo de Rivera, Captain General of Catalonia, rose in September, 1923, and issued a pronunciamento; and, at the same time, the ministers of state resigned. The King of Spain did what a year before (October, 1922) the King of Italy had done: Alfonso XIII called upon Prima de Rivera to organize a government, the "Military Directory" or a dictatorship.

Rivera introduced a strong regime. He made short shrift of the terrorizing gunmen, showed sympathy for the working classes, held the scales evenly in all industrial disputes, improved public services (4000 new schools were built), and in co-operation with the French achieved victory in Morocco (1926). Nevertheless, Rivera was not destined to enjoy the continuity of a Mussolini or Hitler. He had neglected to get his *coup d'état* ratified by the *Cortes* or parliament; he was ignorant and contemptuous of parliamentary government and of all it stood for; his brusque treatment of the politicians was highly impolitic; he was often at loggerheads with the king. Moreover, he had failed (unlike his Italian counterpart and later his German) to create a strong party behind him, nor did he care for the organization of public opinion. Given the proverbial restlessness of Spain these mistakes were fatal to his regime. During 1929 agitation ran strong against him, and he appealed by referendum to the army for the continuance of his power. This alienated the king. Primo de Rivera was forced to resign in January, 1930.

Things were quiet for a while, and many Spaniards doubtlessly looked forward to the return of constitutional government. It was not to be. The real revolution was in the offing, that of 1931; that which led to another Spanish republic, the first attempted since the disastrous republican failure of 1873. When Rivera went, the only organizations left intact were those of revolution. General Berenguer was appointed prime minister by the king, but he postponed elections to reconstitute parliamentary government partly because the politicians refused to co-operate with him. His regime was hardly less dictatorial than that of Primo de Rivera. The politicians, liberals and intellectuals for the most part wanted to rid Spain of what they considered the incubus of the monarchy (spirit of the generation of 1898); they desired a republic. So, during this year

of 1930 they drew together and organized.

The Ateneo of Madrid, literary club and focus of liberal opinion, was reopened without authorization at the fall of Rivera. Elected as president was Manual Azaña, literary man, politician, and outspoken republican. Three of his school organized the "League for the Service of the Republic." These were Dr. Gregorio Marañón, medical specialist with wide clientele among royalty and the aristocracy; Ramon Pérez de Ayala, leading novelist; and José Ortega y Gasset, university professor and internationally known author of *The Revolt of the Masses* and *Invertebrate Spain*. These men demonstrated a typical Spanish idealism. Since the monarchy was in "the last stages of decomposition," as they gave forth in a manifesto, they would have a republic which would combine "dynamic force with discipline." They called upon all Spaniards "to join in the supreme enterprise of resuscitating the history of Spain." They appealed especially to the professional classes and invited the collaboration of the young. "The republic will be the symbol of the fact that Spaniards have at last resolved to act with vigor and to take into their own hands their own destiny." Such movements were accompanied by more stirring messages. In Madrid's most respected periodical Ortega y Gasset cried: "Spaniards your state is no more. Reconstruct it! *Delenda est Monarchia.*" In the meantime a Revolutionary Committee was formed, while Alcalá Zamora became leader of the revolutionary intellectuals.

The movement was aided by the ineffectiveness of Prime Minister Berenguer's government. During the summer of 1930 the monetary exchange dropped steadily with resultant strikes in a dozen cities. When the universities reopened in October, there took place a recurrence of student riots. December 15 was set for a general uprising of the military garrisons of Spain. The garrison of the little town of Jaca at the foot of the Pyrenees anticipated the date and caused the collapse of the plan. The eight hundred men were soon overpowered and two of their leaders were shot. These men, Galán and Garcíá Hernández, became now the "martyrs of the revolution," and their portraits were exhibited everywhere. The Revolutionary Committee at once issued a manifesto. It declared full consciousness of its "mission and responsibility" and called itself into the provisional government of the Spanish Republic. Twelve men signed the document. Some were arrested; the rest fled the country. One rising of December 15 did materialize in Madrid. The commandant of the aerodrome, Ramón Franco, aided by General Queipo de Llano, took the aerodrome and flew over the Capital dropping pamphlets which shouted from their pages: "Spaniards! The Republic has been proclaimed." This movement too was overpowered while martial law was proclaimed and censorship re-imposed upon the press for a period of six weeks. The universities were closed. But all of this could not suppress the general strikes which especially in the north were plaguing the nation.

One hopeful note rose from the midst of the increasing chaos: the government began to speak of general elections, and these were finally promised. The date fixed was March, 1931. Nevertheless, the wave of national confusion continued to mount in a bewildering

crescendo, until finally in the middle of February the Berenguer government resigned. After various manouverings on the part of the now isolated king, the Conde de Romanones formed a new government which made various important decisions, among them the fixing of the elections for Sunday, April 12. These would be municipal; they were to be followed by parliamentary which would select the *Cortes* for the framing of a new constitution. Meantime, leaders of the revolutionary manifesto—Alcalá Zamora, Fernando de los Ríos, Miguel Maura, Alvaro de Albornoz, Largo Caballero, and Casares Quiroga—were tried and sentenced to imprisonment for six months and a day. But the popular manifestations against the sentence were so boisterous that these men were immediately released and became the idols of the people. This was less than three weeks before the municipal elections. It was the hope of the revolutionary leaders that the results of the elections would demonstrate an overwhelming majority in favor of the republic and that the monarchy might collapse by summer. The end came sooner than they expected.

#### *Founding of the Second Republic*

The elections went off quietly, more quietly than any election old timers could remember, and the returns in the two most important cities, Madrid and Barcelona, were overwhelmingly republican. In the latter the Republicans polled 90,000 to the Monarchists 33,000, so that the prime minister was stunned at the "spectacle of a country which we believed to be monarchist turning republican within twenty-four hours." The later returns showed that all of the large towns had voted republican by large majorities. Count Romanones relayed this information to the king on Tuesday and advised his leaving the country. To this the king consented, for he said he wished no drop of blood to be shed. Romanones met with Alcalá Zamora, leader of the Revolutionary Committee. The latter insisted: "The King must hand over his authority to us and leave Spain immediately." By two in the afternoon (Tuesday, April 14) the arrangements were completed. Without formal abdication the king was to leave that night. He accepted with serenity and was soon on his way. Meanwhile the Republic had been proclaimed in Barcelona, while in Madrid by the middle of the afternoon the Republican tricolor of red, yellow, and purple, was hoisted over the Post Office building. The flag seemed suddenly to spring out from every home and shop, cabinet and shelf. Soon all Madrid was brilliant with the flashy colors. Before nightfall Alcalá Zamora and his group went to the Home Office, were admitted, and took over the government of Spain. Arrangements were completed that night, and by two in the morning Spain had her republican government. That day, Wednesday, April 15, was declared a national holiday, for it was the first day of the Second Republic.

This marked the end of the first phase of the revolution. Spaniards, Spanish leaders, had now a free and open field upon which to build the beautiful republic of their ideals and of their dreams. It was the second time they desired to fashion a republic. Events would demonstrate whether they would be able to succeed.

(Please turn to page eighty-three)

# The Polish Insurrection of 1830

## Anthony Czajkowski

*St. Louis University*

THE year 1830 was marked by outbreaks of revolutionary movements in many sections of Europe. These outbreaks were manifestations of the desire of the different peoples to throw off the yoke placed upon them by the forces of reaction and to rise united among the family of nations. The most bloody struggle which took place in the general upheaval of 1830 was the revolution which broke out in Poland at the end of that year. The chances of success were, in retrospect, slight, but the Poles took that chance to rid themselves of the despotic rule of the Russians. The ten months' campaign was bloody and unmerciful, but finally the preponderant strength of the Russian army prevailed, and Poland was again bathed in the blood of her people.

The causes of the insurrection are not hard to find. Poland had been set up by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 as a national unit bound to Russia by a Constitution which guaranteed Poland her rights and liberties. During the lifetime of Alexander I the Constitution had been respected and the Poles had maintained a national existence and relative self-government. In 1825, Alexander I died and was succeeded by his brother, Nicholas I, who was crowned Tsar of Russia in 1826 and King of Poland in 1829 at Warsaw. Violations of the Constitution became progressively more frequent and a policy of suppressing Polish nationality was introduced.

### *First Signs of Revolt*

Due to this policy, the spirit of disaffection rose among the Poles, especially among the army men, many of whom had fought in the ranks of Napoleon. In 1828, a secret organization, calling itself the Patriotic Club, was begun at Warsaw, composed of army men, of men of letters, and of students from the University of Warsaw.<sup>1</sup> These men originally intended to give the signal for a rising during the Turkish war, but the circumstances were unfavorable. There were subsequent plans to set the flame of insurrection in motion at the time of the coronation at Warsaw (May, 1829), and later at the meeting of the Polish Diet (May, 1830).<sup>2</sup> Both times, however, the movement was insufficiently prepared and the decisive moment had to be postponed. Meanwhile, the country was pervaded by a deep sense of discontent and apprehension over the daily violations of the Constitution which threatened its very existence.

During this period, while the country groaned and the revolutionaries hesitated, came news of the French Revolution of July, 1830. The success of the *coup d'état* in Paris caused general excitement throughout Poland. It provided a strong stimulus to the Patriotic Club which was reflected in a sharp rise in its membership.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Joseph Hordynski, *History of the Late Polish Revolution* (Boston, 1832), pp. 14-15.

<sup>2</sup> Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X (New York, 1907), p. 464.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 464. In October, 1830, seventy-seven officers of the garrison belonged to the movement. Soon afterwards their number reached 200.

More directly, however, did the July Revolution accelerate the movement in Poland. News of the successful *coup d'état* by Louis Philippe determined Nicholas I to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. The Tsar, hearing the tidings from Paris, immediately prepared for war against France to suppress the revolution, with the expectation that Prussia would join him in the campaign. He ordered the Polish Army to be mobilized for the campaign and the finances of the kingdom to be placed at his disposal. This was August 18, 1830. The Russian general Diebitsch, who was selected as commander-in-chief of the projected campaign, was dispatched to Berlin on August 31 to gain the adherence of Frederick William III to the proposal and to draw up plans for the campaign with the Prussian generals. However, since both England and Austria had already recognized Louis Philippe, Prussia hesitated in making definite commitments and gave an evasive reply to Diebitsch.

News of the Tsar's plan to use Polish troops and finances in the West caused the Polish conspirators to hasten their plans. They communicated with Lafayette in Paris and received encouragement from him. They then approached the most popular man in the kingdom, General Chlopicki, who had fought with distinction under Napoleon and who had retired into private life, to head the revolution. Doubtful of the success of the insurrection, he declined. Thus disappointed and uncertain whether Nicholas would persist in his plans for an expedition to the West, the revolutionaries postponed the date of the rising, originally set for October 20, 1830, until the spring of the following year.<sup>4</sup>

But events intervened which hastened the outbreak. News of the Belgian Revolution confirmed the intention of Tsar Nicholas I to take action. Diebitsch was again sent to Prussia to complete arrangements for an expedition against France and Belgium, and December 22 was fixed by the Tsar as the opening date for the Western campaign. The Polish Army was to serve as the vanguard of the expedition, and Modlin and Warsaw were stored with large quantities of arms and ammunition for the Army.<sup>5</sup>

To anticipate the march of the Army, the members of the Patriotic Club voted to advance the date of the rising. The outbreak of the insurrection was fixed for November 29, 1830.

### *Armed Revolution*

On the night of November 29 the conspirators launched a double attack in Warsaw, one on the Belvedere Palace where resided the Grand Duke Constantine, Viceroy of Poland, and another on the barracks of the Russian cavalry. In both places the attacks failed to gain their objectives, but the spark had been ignited and was

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 465.

<sup>5</sup> Hordynski, *History of the Polish Revolution*, p. 16.

spread rapidly to the rest of the country.<sup>6</sup> By this outbreak, the efforts and intentions of Nicholas were immediately paralyzed; France was saved from danger and Prussia was delivered from an awkward dilemma.<sup>7</sup>

The Poles began the revolt with some chance of success, for they had a well-drilled and well-equipped army of about 30,000 men, which they increased by recruiting to 110,000. Against these, the Russians, with considerable difficulty succeeded in putting only about 114,000 men in the field. Furthermore, the vacillation and weakness of the Grand Duke Constantine allowed the revolt to grow. The first step of the revolutionists was to set up a provisional government under Prince Adam Czartoryski and General Chłopicki. General Chłopicki proclaimed himself Dictator.

Futile negotiations followed between the Grand Duke Constantine and the provisional government. On December 12, Constantine left Poland and crossed into Russia. On January 25, Nicholas was declared deposed as King of Poland by the Polish Diet.<sup>8</sup> This proved to be a double blunder, for it hastened the warlike action of Russia, and rendered diplomatic intervention by the European powers more difficult.<sup>9</sup>

The arms of the insurrectionists were at first crowned with success. The Russian commander had underestimated the strength of the Polish forces and had prepared for a campaign of only one month's duration to crush the rebellion.<sup>10</sup> In February, 1831, Diebitsch was forced to discontinue operations and to repair to winter quarters. The Poles passed to the offensive and won limited successes in the following two months. However, lack of intelligent military leadership prevented the exploitation of favorable circumstances for the total defeat of the Russian army.<sup>11</sup>

Discord in the ranks of the Poles began to manifest itself. The Polish aristocratic class, headed by Czartoryski and Chłopicki, had the upper hand in the councils of the revolution at its inception. They were opposed by a group of political radicals led by the historian Lelewel.<sup>12</sup> This division paralyzed the efforts of the Poles. Successes in the field gave momentary prestige to the aristocratic element guiding the government, and

<sup>6</sup> *The Cambridge History of Poland, 1697-1935* (ed. by W. F. Reddaway, J. H. Penson, O. Halecki, R. Dyboski), Cambridge, 1941, p. 296.

<sup>7</sup> *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. X, p. 466. J. A. Galecki, *A Sketch of the History of Poland*, London, 1843, p. 20. The author, an exile and a captain in the revolutionary army, bitterly indicts the part of France in the outbreak of the revolution. He writes, "After the French Revolution of 1830 the government of their newly created King, Louis Philippe, sent emissaries and agents to Poland in order to excite the inhabitants of that country to revolt against Russia. The French king, conscious of the hatred prevailing against him in the breasts of the legitimate monarchs, wished to excite their subjects to revolt, in order to engage their strength in the struggle against their own people, and thereby divert their attention from France."

The agents from Paris, furnished with authentic letters from the most influential personages, promised the chiefs of the then preparing Polish insurrection the most energetic support on the part of France, and thereby contributed much towards hastening the outbreak of the Polish revolution."

<sup>8</sup> Frederick B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832*, New York and London, 1934, p. 283. Also *Cambridge History of Poland*, p. 299.

<sup>9</sup> *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. X, p. 469.

<sup>10</sup> *Cambridge History of Poland*, p. 300.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 300-310.

<sup>12</sup> Artz, *Reaction and Revolution*, p. 283.

constrained the opposition to remain under surface. On May 26, however, the Polish Army suffered a terrible defeat at Ostrelenka. News of the retreat of the revolutionary army toward Warsaw created a turmoil in that city which resulted in riots. Czartoryski and three members of his government resigned, and the radical element assumed command.

Recovering from the defeat, the Polish Army was re-grouped for a renewed effort against the Russians. Lack of capable leadership, however, continued to preclude success in the field. Cholera appeared among the men of both sides and decimated Polish and Russian ranks. The Grand Duke Constantine and Commander-in-Chief Diebitsch fell victims to the plague.

Lack of domestic support also hindered the revolutionary movement. While the city population of Warsaw engaged in renewed rioting, in the countryside the peasants remained apathetic to the Polish cause. The Diet, composed mainly of nobles, promulgated a few reforms to lighten the burdens of the agricultural classes, but it undertook nothing which would arouse the interest or enthusiasm of the peasants in the cause of Polish freedom.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, the Tsar encouraged the cleavage between the Polish nobility and Polish peasantry by extending to the peasants the protection of his government.

#### Betrayal on the Continent

The fortunes of the Polish movement were further impeded by the actions of Austria and Prussia. Both countries actively aided the Russians and hindered the operations of the Polish army. Austria played only a minor role in the insurrection. When the revolutionary army was gaining successes in the early weeks of the movement, Austria followed a policy of watchful waiting. Austria realized that its portion of Poland, the province of Galicia, was openly sympathetic to the cause of the revolution; and, rather than hazard a revolt in the province, she permitted the active sympathizers to cross the border and to join the Polish army.<sup>14</sup>

In another instance, however, Austria proved to be less sympathetic to the Polish movement. On April 23, 1831, General Dwernicki engaged a Russian corps under General Rott near the Austrian frontier. In the course of battle both armies crossed into Austrian territory. Upon the challenge from an Austrian cavalry contingent the battle was disengaged, and both sides awaited the decision of the Austrian government concerning the action to be taken against their armies for the violation of neutral territory. The government in Vienna decided that the Polish Army was to be disarmed and interned; the Russian troops were to be permitted to recross the frontier and to return to Poland.<sup>15</sup> An important segment of the Polish fighting force was thus lost to the revolutionaries.

In the chambers of the Foreign Office Metternich was engaged in a skillful diplomatic maneuver. He held secret conferences with the Polish envoy, and the Poles

(Please turn to page eighty-six)

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 284.

<sup>14</sup> Speech of Colonel Evans in the House of Commons, August 7, 1832. *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. XIV, c. 1210.

<sup>15</sup> Hordynski, *History of the Polish Revolution*, p. 247.

# A German Outlook on History

## James Collins

*St. Louis University*

THE great problems facing the governments engaged in the postwar European occupation have increased our responsibility to learn about the German people and their past history, and to explore all the reasonable possibilities for a lasting peaceful settlement.\* Unfortunately, a good many of the recent books on this question see German (especially Prussian) history as a thousand-year conspiracy against the West, and the German character as a psychosis-ridden center of perpetual danger for other nations. Little of long-range constructive guidance can be gathered from these sources, since they stem from the same kind of outlook which prevailed in the world which gave birth to Nazism. The excessive nationalism, militarism and cynical pragmatism which undermined the best efforts of peacemakers during the twenties both within Germany and abroad cannot be overcome by segregating or dismembering that country, or by an appeal to the nostrums of a doubtful brand of psychiatry and educational propaganda. Not even the convenient myth of the two Germanies will prove of much avail in dealing with a people whose common destiny has persisted for centuries in spite of profound internal conflicts. Germany must be treated as a single entity and as an integral member of the European community of nations.

Loewenstein seeks to avoid the pitfalls of foreshortened perspective and hasty diagnosis in this study of the Germans' place in history, the materials for which he began collecting even before Hitler's advent to power in 1933. From his autobiography and political analyses, American readers have become familiar with Loewenstein's princely background, his education and work among the republican youth of Weimar Germany, and his detailed suggestions for the rehabilitation of his native land. In this latest volume he places his own experience and hopes within the wider context of the "Christian Ghibelline" philosophy of history to which his Catholic faith and historical studies have led. Special chapters are devoted to the thinkers who have most influenced his general outlook: Augustine, Dante, the fourteenth-century German mystics, Hegel and Marx, Stefan George and Ricarda Huch (the author of various works on the notion and history of *Reich*). It is important also to note the disposition of materials in the book. The history of the Roman Empire and of Germany before the Religious Revolt is discussed in the first 150 pages in which the main lines of the author's thesis are laid down; with three chapters devoted to the intervening three centuries, the remaining 300 pages of the work are concerned with nineteenth and twentieth-century Germany. Stress is thus laid upon a comparison between the relations of medieval and of late modern Germany to the rest of Europe. The medieval vision

of *Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicae* moves throughout these pages, serving as a standard of judgment upon actual affairs and as a guiding hope for the future of the West.

After a good deal of discussion pro and con, American historians are pretty well agreed (in Frederick Jackson Turner's words, recalled for us by the late Carl Becker) that "the question is not whether you have a philosophy of history, but whether the one you have is good for anything." And the worth of any philosophy of history cannot be completely assayed by the historian alone: he must call in the philosopher and perhaps even the theologian. Certainly no adequate estimate of Loewenstein's views can be made on their historical merits alone or even primarily. The basic facts of history are respected, and a careful use of sources has been made. But they are a framework for and a function of the philosophy.

The author's debt to Christian doctrine is obviously heavy on essential points. Instead of secular optimism based on the discredited notions of indefinite progress and perfectibility, Loewenstein returns to the traditional teaching on God as the creator Whose providential designs are operative throughout all history, directing human affairs to righteous and even sacral ends despite evil and betrayal. Whatever the anticipations made by a Stoic elite, it was the Augustinian conception of the two cities which gave men generally a consciousness of universal community, historical purpose and freedom. The Christocentric view of history places the Incarnation at the center of human events, and it is with reference to it that time becomes significant and the proper respect is accorded both to spirit and to flesh. But a difference of theological opinion concerning the inevitability of the Incarnation does not justify Loewenstein's preference of Duns Scotus over Aquinas as the great medieval exponent of a Christian conception of history. And it is his enthusiasm for "the greatest Frederick" rather than a study of the relevant Thomistic texts which leads him to speak of the "static and somewhat antihistorical philosophy" (p. 131) of St. Thomas. His political philosophy was not exhausted with the *De Reginime Principum*. The friend of St. Louis of France recognized the need for social progress, the commonwealth of states and the rightful sphere of temporal society.

For Loewenstein, the Trinity is not only the deepest revealed mystery but also the very axis on which the history of the world turns, an expression which at once calls to mind Hegel's remark that this doctrine is the goal and starting point of history. Through the continuity provided by Augustine, Duns Scotus and Hegel, the author sees a common Christian and German tradition forming the solid core of philosophy of history. In reclaiming Hegel for perennial philosophy, he is engaged in the same intrepid pioneer work that is being done more

\**The Germans in History*, by Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein. Columbia University Press. New York. 1945. pp. xii + 584. \$5.00

technically in the spheres of metaphysics and theory of knowledge by Engert and Steinbüchel. Holding that the true Hegel is that vast portion of his thought which can be reconciled with Christian dogma, Loewenstein vigorously affirms that this truth is worth saving, worth "baptizing". Relying perhaps too exclusively upon Hegel's *History of Philosophy* and *Philosophy of Religion*, he denies the presence of pantheism or a deification of the state in the author of "the greatest *apologia fidei* in centuries" (p. 229). Yet he admits that the notion of the state as the instrument of history, having its own ethics and infallible justification, did serve as a bolster for the Metternich system. The dangers latent in this attempt to surprise the secrets of Providence in man's regard are also seen in Loewenstein's own frequent use of such terms as "universal mandate," "historical necessity," "verdict of history," and "world-historical figure" (the latter designation calling up in reply Kierkegaard's biting mockery of Hegelian pomposity). It is difficult, for instance, to follow the principle of universalism employed in maintaining that Wallenstein had history's mandate to seize imperial power from the weak hands of Emperor Ferdinand (pp. 181-182), or that Bismarck was the bearer of a historical mandate in his war against Austria (p. 304). Here we are reminded of Thomas Mann's justification of Frederick the Great, or of Goethe's defense of Napoleon, on the grounds that the bearer of historical necessity is his own justification beyond the standards ruling common clay. Loewenstein does, however, insist that human freedom and the objective nature of the moral law are basic principles in the Christian attitude towards history.

Whether this attitude can be strictly called a *philosophy* of history remains a debatable point, indicating the caution which must be observed in using Hegel. With the best good will and for widely divergent reasons, both philosophers and theologians have challenged Hegel's reduction of revealed truths to an essentially philosophical status. Although this is consistent with the primacy which he assigns to philosophy as capable of comprehending all truth, it leads to a kind of rationalism which accords neither with faith nor with reason. There is no doubt, however, that the Christian mind is profoundly transformed by sharing in the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation. Thus Loewenstein sees in history a constant dialogue between God, nature and man, a dialectical tension between the Logos and the men whom He has created in freedom and destined for perfect justice and love. A divine and personal Wisdom (but one not to be confused with the Kantian Reason) prepares the Kingdom of God among men, and the state itself must finally minister to the growth of the *Civitas Dei*.

Yet the Earthly City has a *justitia* of its own and an immanent dialectical law, the exposition of which is the main theme of this book. The thetic moment in our history is the single historical, moral and cultural entity, the Occident. Born of the Roman Empire and developing in close harmony with the Christian Church, this conviction of the essential oneness of mankind and of our common destiny has provided a universal element in Western life, a general standard whereby to judge

the achievements of particular periods and groups, an all-embracing whole within which the components of Occidental civilization find their proper co-ordinate positions. In antithesis to the ecumenical standpoint, our history has also witnessed the development of nationalist trends, of cultural differentiation and political diversity among Western peoples. Although he does not subscribe to the Germanocentric version of history, Loewenstein studies the interplay of universal and national trends mainly in terms of the German development. Several reasons support this approach. It is intended as a corrective for the usual Anglo-American account which overlooks the central position, culturally and politically as well as geographically, of the heartland of Europe; events in Germany have microcosmically mirrored the general European situation; the German nation has had a special role in the development of the Sacred Roman Empire and is still destined to embody anew the idea of the *Reich* so desecrated by Hitler. The function of the antithesis must here be taken in the Hegelian sense of *Aufhebung*. The cultivation of the national genius has not cancelled out the universal whole which is Europe, but rather has enriched and developed it. Thus the Occident considered as assimilative of the various national contributions is also the synthesis of the dialectical process of history, a *telos* towards which we are always moving under the government of God.

This is the core of the volume. In its light all the major events in German history are evaluated, not always with complete success. Thus his anti-Guelph sentiments prevent him, as they did Dante, from doing full justice to all the issues involved in the medieval conflicts between popes and emperors. When there was conflict, the former were not always acting as particularist-minded petty princes, and the latter did not always represent the side of freedom and universality and Christian solidarity. That papal and curial influence was undoubtedly often enlisted in unworthy causes is perhaps the reason why Loewenstein locates the source of all political sovereignty in the Empire (p. 111), and unduly restricts the proper function of the Church with respect to "the purely temporal realm of state and politics" (p. 350; cf. pp. 137, 396). The attempt to correlate the aspirations of the medieval German mystics towards the Absolute with the German attitude towards the Empire (ch. 13) is a highly subjective interpretation. The familiar contention that Austria is an unfortunately-detached member of the Germanic body, is reaffirmed throughout this book, raising the question whether Loewenstein admits of a genuine development in the notion of the *Reich*. The analogical nature of this political ideal is at least implied in the Hegelian teaching that actual institutions are but fleeting moments in the historical dialectic (p. 236), and in Loewenstein's program for a reorganized Germany.

Most provocative and challenging to readers who are familiar with the conventional account of the growth of modern Germany is the analysis offered here from a standpoint not widely shared by other Germans now in America. The Junkers are attacked not for an excessive nationalism or statism but for their isolationist particularism which hindered German unification and land reforms, and for their opposition to the *Anschluss* with

Austria as well as to every use of the army in aid of foreign policies (pp. 221, 302, 328). Because of the absence of any strong religious belief in a personal God among the leaders of the French Revolution, its proper contribution is not an increase of freedom and social justice, but rather an unbridled nationalism and a legal positivism which have undermined democracy by spreading moral anarchy (pp. 209-210). Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* are rightly absolved from the charge of fostering power politics and unbridled nationalism, while Wagner is less justifiably acquitted. Although not uncritical of Bismarck, who lacked the imperial breadth of Stein's outlook, Loewenstein presents a detailed and sympathetic study of his comparatively temperate political policy and his social reforms. It is not difficult to scout the Bismarck legend circulated first by German nationalists and later in a contrary spirit by Vansittart-minded journalists abroad. Equally incisive and convincing are his observations about a special German war guilt for the First World War, the connection between capitalism and the varieties of totalitarianism, the strength and weakness of the Weimar Republic, and the fatal blunders which marked the chancellorship of Brüning.

Christian thinkers of whatever political or national allegiance will agree with Loewenstein's thoughtful reflections upon the causes of Nazism and his general recommendations concerning the future of Europe.

To the philosopher of history, harsh as it may sound, National Socialism presents itself as the logical conclusion of the development of modern mass democracy in its secularized, finally de-Christianized form. A society of relativistic values resting precariously on a naturalistic view of man may in the infernal mirror of totalitarianism recognize its own ravaged face.... The anxious cry for democracy rising today just as it rose in the nineteenth century will avail nothing so long as men disdain to see the true sources of democracy. From this viewpoint, the revolutions of the last few generations reveal their hopeless futility. Their failure was a foregone conclusion, and deeper slavery has come out of each new disappointment met in the effort to do by barricades, by reforms and by ballots what can be done only by the re-Christianization of man (pp. 486, 258).

If Loewenstein turns first of all for true democratic policy to the Five Point Peace Program of Pius XII, it is because he realizes that economic, social and political rehabilitation must be reintegrated with religious faith and with a respect for the moral law and personal freedom based upon religious motives. In thus relativizing the importance of economic reasons and scientific procedure for the decisive regeneration of the Occident, this solution contrasts sharply with the naturalistic principles dictating our present policy in Germany. A careful study of *The Germans in History* would help to avoid the parochialism which marked the Allied program during the twenties and which made almost inevitable the collapse of the Weimar Republic.

## Spanish Revolution

(Continued from page seventy-eight)

Any obstacle would come from themselves, not from without.

Events had been thus far remarkably calm, an exceptional thing in Spain. Any excitement had been constructive, enthusiasm for the Republic. Alas! The king's abdication was not yet a month old when trouble began, the trouble which recurred in successively greater waves

of destruction, tidal waves which within five years would roar over and carry away the Republic.

The first stirring of division (that fatal malady of the Latin states) came from the famous monarchist newspaper, the A.B.C., whose editor had gone to London, obtained an interview with Alfonso XIII, featured it, and added expressions of loyalty to the "Parliamentary and Constitutional Monarchy." Within a few days the Cardinal-Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of all Spain, Monseñor Segura, uttered impolitic words, very disquieting to republican leaders: he praised the successful reign of Alfonso XIII, spoke of the present as a moment of terrible uncertainty, and of a road open to those who are attempting to destroy religion. As a result, the republican Minister of Justice condemned the pastoral as "belligerent"; the government petitioned the Holy See for his removal, and he was ultimately expelled from the country.

### *Conflict with the Monarchs*

Spirits which harbor explosives cannot long be contained. On Sunday, May 10, within the first month of its career what had been called the "immaculate republic" was going to be soiled in blood. This is what happened. Late Sunday morning a newly organized monarchist club was holding a meeting on the crowded Calle de Alcalá in Madrid. They offered some provocation in monarchist hymns or cries. A crowd collected; some began shouting "Long live the Republic"; two monarchists arrived at the club and were paying off their taxis. They shouted, "Long live the Monarchy" and struck the drivers. A riot ensued which spread all over the city. By nightfall monarchists had narrowly escaped lynching, the offices of the monarchist paper A.B.C. had been burned, while far into the night frenzied republicans wreaked their vengeance upon whatever house or building came under their suspicion. The blood of the Madrid mob was up. Next morning in broad daylight men set fire to the Jesuit church and crowds gathered, placidly watching it burn to the ground. When firemen came they were prevented from taking action. Then crowds with red flags marched to the new and magnificent plant of the Carmelite fathers and dealt with it similarly. Before this second day of disorder was finished a dozen religious houses, colleges, or convents went up in smoke. An ominous sign for the newborn republic was this: the Government showed itself powerless to stop these destructive disorders; the thirteen hour sitting of the cabinet was marked with inefficiency and division. Outside Madrid, a dozen other cities witnessed the same disorders. Málaga suffered conflagration for two days in which religious houses and churches, shops and public buildings were burned. Soon all was quiet again, except that revolutionary strikes began to break out and to increase in frequency as the weeks passed. The result was: death and the enactment of martial law.

The immediate task of the Government was to organize elections for the creation of a congress which should have full administrative and constituent powers. The elections held in June were gratifying to Republicans and to the left generally. Right wing republicans received only twenty-eight representatives, while those of the left wing polled 145 members. Moreover, Social-

ists won 114 seats, Radical Socialists, fifty-six. Conservatives or Monarchists numbered only twenty. The Congress met in Madrid early in July and proceeded to create a constitution and to govern the country. But strikes organized by syndicalist and anarchist groups were increasing, and Seville all but passed completely under mob rule. On July 20 a general strike was declared. The result was: thirty killed and 200 wounded, martial law, armed aircraft over the capital, closing of syndicalist and communist headquarters. It was clear that many Spaniards especially of the working classes, a long-abused and suffering mass of humanity, desired not a republic, but a thoroughgoing social revolution.

From July to December the Congress or *Cortes* worked on the constitution. By the end of the year (1931) the instrument was ready. There is no space to analyze it. There were many admirable statements and provisions, liberal and generous, especially regarding the underprivileged. Among other economic provisions, it stipulated for a more equitable distribution of the land, especially in the Southwest where a feudal *latifundia* effected extreme economic abuses. It was less liberal in its provisions concerning the religious orders, some of which the republican leaders (not without reason) considered potential enemies of the republic. Over this question the Congress split. The lead in this fight was taken by Manuel Azaña (himself product of education by a religious order) and by Fernando de los Ríos. Among other provisions were the following: that no member of an order be allowed to teach, and that the Jesuits be dissolved and expelled. Azaña admitted these were not "liberal" measures, but they were necessary for the well-being of the republic. In the midst of the controversy two cabinet members resigned, including the prime minister of the provisional government, Alcalá Zamora; and when the vote was taken, three other cabinet members were absent and half the assembly either remained away or did not vote. This too was ominous for the future of the republic. There was going to be a split between clericals and anti-clericals even among the leaders, to say nothing of the people; and the passions thus aroused became furious and destructive. But the Left were for the nonce in the majority, and they were able to have their way. Historically, it has been a fault of Latins in their attempts at democracy to legislate not for the nation but for their own political party or group. Then action is followed by reaction, and the pendulum swings lustily.

This leftist regime continued from December, 1931, to November, 1933, with the mildly clerical Alcalá Zamora president of the republic and the passionately anti-clerical Manuel Azaña head of the cabinet! It was a troubled period. It began with the murder of four civil guards at Castilblanco in the Southwest by strikers. The murders were accompanied with the most revolting barbarities. The affair set strikes a-going all over Spain. Anarchists, communists, syndicalists, though fundamentally divided in their own incompatible ideas, united thus early to destroy the republic. The nationwide slogan was: "We have got our republic; now let us have our revolution." Bilbao in the north was for days a focal point of riots, shooting, and arson. Prime Minister Azaña, while he struck against the extremists of the

Left, also moved against the Right. The Society of Jesus was declared officially dissolved in Spanish territory January 23, 1932. In August rightist revolts led by monarchists and army officers broke out both in Madrid and Seville. In January, 1933, rebels in the south proclaimed a communist regime. Thus early was the young republic torn from the Right and from the Left.

In the Northeast, Catalonia, having received its petitioned autonomy, remained quiet and content. The rest of Spain was in a mounting fever. In the midst of all of this the government (in too great haste it would seem) took measures to apply the education laws. Seventeen thousand secondary pupils and the many more thousands of pupils of the elementary grades then taught by the religious orders were to be absorbed by the state in October, 1933. Seven thousand new schools had to be provided for, and 7000 new teachers trained. Fernando de los Ríos said he could do it. But he was delayed and before anything happened this Leftist government fell.

#### *Rightest Reactions*

The regime had endured for almost two years, but its unpopularity steadily increased. Among many other things, it was blamed for excessive cruelty in the suppression of the various revolts. Opposition in the *Cortes* itself became so great that the government resigned, and general elections were organized for November, 1933. They returned a government of the Right and Center as follows: Right parties, 207; Center, 167; Left 99. The pendulum, constantly swinging in Spain, had swung again. The Right and Center would now have its day (November, 1933—January, 1936). Immediately there were revolts from the Left. In Barcelona, Saragossa, Huesca, and Barbastro, anarcho-syndicalists organized attacks upon the civic guard which had to be repressed with bloodshed. The loyalty of the guards and of the army at this period saved the republic.

As time went on things quieted down and the influence of the Right was observable. The substitution of lay schools for religious was dropped; back salaries were paid to beneficed clergy; the Jesuits returned and began to teach again in the capital. Land reforms in the Southwest, in Extremadura and in Andalusia, hardly ever begun, were now entirely neglected. A new monarchist club appeared. Gil Robles united the Catholic parties under CEDA. For a brief term the internationally known scholar and thinker, Salvador de Madariaga, became Minister of Education.

But there was little stability: ministries rose and fell; the government could accomplish little of importance; Gil Robles could not attain the post of Prime Minister. In 1934 there was serious trouble. Regionalism now appeared in the two Basque provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, and Catalonia assumed a practically independent position. There were peasant strikes owing to the slowness of the land reforms. Besides, Left leaders in the *Cortes* passed from abstentionism to obstruction and finally seemed not unwilling to stop short at open revolt. Manuel Azaña said he despaired of Spain. He could not serve a republic imbued with monarchism. "We do not want a republic such as that."

As the year waned trouble mounted: on October 5 an almost complete general strike paralyzed the whole

of Spain; the following day Catalonia declared herself completely independent, and a rebellion in the Asturias almost knocked over Madrid's republican regime. Here the government found itself confronted with 6,000 rebels, chiefly miners, fully armed and provided with tanks, machine guns, armored cars, and dynamite. The rebels had possessed themselves by force of the important city of Oviedo which had to be stormed and retaken by General López Ochoa. The toll was 1,335 killed, mostly civilians, and 2,951 wounded, also mostly civilians. Oviedo became a city of ruins; its principle streets and public buildings had been destroyed. "There has been war in Spain," said a Spanish reporter, "and the city devastated by it has been Oviedo."

The ravaging of the northern extremists strengthened the prestige of the Right and Center for a while, yet this government as it went into the months of 1935 became mired in divisions and changes, shifts and ineffectualities. Ministries rose and fell in a sort of kalaidoscopic rapidity. Some cabinets could last hardly more than a month, and then the country would be treated to a fresh batch of figureheads. Some said the condition was worse than the worst days of the monarchy. Many blamed this state of affairs on the passive resistance of President Alcalá Zamora who, because of personal reasons, would not appoint the leader of the strongest party, Gil Robles, to the premiership.

In the meantime a varied assortment of leftists and radicals—socialists, anarchists, syndicalists and communists—was organizing to overthrow the republic in a radical revolution. The Communist International (October, 1932) said: "Revolution is taking place in Spain, and at the present time the mass movement is seething and showing tendencies to develop into an armed revolt of the people." Andres Nin, a Catalan, who had been in Moscow, said in January, 1933, to a correspondent of the London *Times*: "We began first with an educational campaign and now we are engaged in organizing Workers Soviets in anticipation of the crucial moment when the workers must be the first to arrive on the scene and to seize power." Dolores Ibarruri, "*La Passionaria*," addressed the Seventh Congress of the Communist International convened in 1935: "Comrades, I bring fraternal greetings to the Seventh World Congress of our Communist International in the name of the Spanish Communist party, in the name of the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry, and particularly in the name of the heroic fighters of Asturias," (referring to the 1934 uprising). The intent of the 1935 revolutionaries is seen in a New Year's greeting to Moscow which was later sent by Largo Caballero, leader of the Socialists and former cabinet member: "The Proletariat of Iberia will try to follow the example of your great country." Finally, in the midst of this political welter Zamora's last cabinet passed a decree dissolving the *Cortes* and calling for re-elections. After some hesitation the President on January 1, 1936, signed the decree of parliament and designated February 16 as the day for the elections.

These elections were to decide whether Spaniards were capable at that time of carrying on a democratic regime. Would the people return a clear mandate either of the Right or of the Left? Would a strong government be

able to pilot through surging seas the republican ship of state? History has given the answer. It was negative.

Although the Right and Center had gained prestige in the suppression of the Asturias revolt, Manuel Azaña now showed remarkable ability in persuading the divided parties of the Left to coalesce into the famous "Popular Front." The elections of February 16 were duly held, and the pendulum again swung back to the Left. The figures of these elections have been variously reported. It was said that through chicanery and violence the Left increased its representation. Perhaps the most reliable figures for the makeup of the *Cortes* are the following: Left, 256 deputies; Center, 52; Right, 165. The Left, in any case, took over, and this was the beginning of a sanguinary chaos in the midst of which the republic came crashing down in civil war while the radical social revolution was being enacted in many parts of Spain. "Spain was to be at peace no more. From the Capital of the Republic to the tiniest rural village, every town trembled with the spirit of extermination and was rocked by a mad storm of passion." Largo Caballero now cried out: "When the hour of revenge is at hand we shall not leave one stone upon another in this Spain which we shall destroy to rebuild our own."

Many prominent rightists, such as the industrial millionaire Juan March, fled over the frontier into France. Shooting matches took place in the streets of the large cities. Murders by the Left, retaliations by the Right or vice versa. Robberies, rapes, and confiscations. Seizures of landed property. Arson! Churches, religious houses, public buildings went up in smoke. And so was Spain whirling dizzily and violently into the abyss. From June 16 to July 13, there were sixty-one dead and 224 wounded in and about Madrid. On July 4, rightist gunmen in passing cars fired pointblank into a crowd emerging from a socialist meeting. Seven socialists were killed and a dozen wounded. July 12, Jose Castillo, lieutenant of the leftist shock troops, was assassinated while leaving his home in a small Madrid street. A companion swore to avenge the murder and the vengeance was swift; for at three the next morning, the thirteenth, a knock on the door of the home of rightist leader, Calvo Sotelo, summoned him out with a warrant for his arrest. He was put into a police van which drove in the direction of the East Cemetery. He was murdered in the van, and his body dumped against the cemetery wall. Both Left and Right were shaken by the crime. One deputy shouted: "This must be the end!"

#### *Beginnings of Civil Strife*

During these very days a plane was being procured in England presumably for a vacation flight to Africa. It put down at Las Palmas in the Canary Islands where was stationed one, General Francisco Franco, who had formerly supported the republic. On July 16, this English plane flew Franco to Africa. On July 17 a number of Moroccan regiments, including Moorish troops and the Foreign Legion, rose in Spanish Morocco. On July 18 in Spain itself, in the Carlist north and in the Monarchist southwest, garrisons were revolting and distinguished generals—Mola, Cabanellas, Queipo de Llano—were leading insurrections. On July 19 General Franco landed his first troops from Africa on the mainland. The cruel

and sanguinary civil war had begun.

The republic, long tottering, was going to fall to the Right or to the Left. The communists in collusion with other types of radicals had matured specific and minute plans for an uprising against the leftist republican government, for they wanted their social revolution. A copy of these plans was discovered among the papers of Commandant Bayo of Majorca; another copy was found at Lora del Río, a third in a village near Badajos, a fourth at La Linea, near Gibraltar. July 25 was the day they had set for the revolt. The rightists just beat them to the gun. But when news of the revolt of the army ran over Spain, the radical revolution, with all its attendant horrors, actually took place in all parts of Spain not dominated by conservatives. There were horrors, too, among the latter. Neither side gave quarter. Spain for close to three years would be drenched in blood, while Josef Stalin would send aid to the one, and Hitler and Mussolini to the other. Not until March, 1939, would this agony end.

#### *Final Judgement on the Second Republic*

Thus was the Second Republic torn apart. Thus had it been with the First Republic, that of 1873. There is striking similarity. In 1873 leftist General Castellar described Spain's plight: "Minds agitated, passions exalted, parties dissolved, administration disorganized, the treasury exhausted, the army distrusted, the civil war gaining way rapidly, and credit swiftly declining." The rightist Gil Robles described Spain's plight in 1933: "There now remains an army crushed, a navy in decline, wealth bled to death, workmen hungry and epileptic, the blood of many hundreds of victims, the orgy of some sterile sumptuary projects, justice torn to pieces, the rights of ownership totally disregarded." Professor W. C. Atkinson recently wrote: "It is a difficult lesson for the Spaniard that extremism is best countered by moderation; yet, until that lesson among others has been learnt, the nation will not have given proofs of its capacity for self-government." And, "All the tactical errors of half a century ago have been repeated. At every turn the Second Republic has walked into traps, often of its own contriving, with its eyes shut." "Impetuosity, personal and party passion, careerism, the intoxication of rhetoric, distrust of technical skill, doctrinaire idealism, impatience with the slowness of political processes, these are racial characteristics which no mere purity of initial purpose will conjure away, and their sum total is stultification." (*Dublin Review*, 400 January, 1937, pp. 16ff.) The republican leader of 1873, Castellar, said: "We Republicans have many prophets, few politicians; we know much of the ideal, little of experience; we embrace the entire heaven of thought and stumble over the first hole in the road." The republican leader of 1926, President Manuel Azaña of the Popular Front Government, averred that democracy could never work smoothly in Spain until the country built up a middle class.

There was instability: the Second Republic had eleven premiers and eighty cabinet ministers in five years. There was division, the common fault of Latins: "The Right sees in each member of the Left a demagogue, and the Left sees in each member of the Right a traitor,"

said Castellar. In 1873 when a federal republic was proposed, for "it had worked in the United States of America," the answer given was that until Spaniards change their nature they can never hope to succeed in organizing such a regime. The clergy had their special weaknesses. Cardinal Goma in the early years of the republic criticized his own clergy for their lack of co-operation, apathy, and the Spanish habit of "keeping yourself at home." "The great mass of the people," said Goma, successor to Segura and Primate of all Spain, "live at an unbridgeable distance from the priest, sometimes with all the prejudices and hatred that the tenacious action of our enemies has inspired in the breast of the people. . ." Hence the burning of churches. The Spanish clergy have been notorious for their uncompromising attitude (a common Spanish trait) and for their extreme or reactionary conservatism.

Practically all the initial leaders—Alcalá Zamora, Marañoñ, Lerroux, and the rest—bitterly regretted the part they had played in organizing the republic. President Zamora later said: "The Government gave reign to the mob, put tools in the hands of their leaders to establish a dictatorship of the streets. . ." And Gregorio Marañoñ: "I wish to express my disillusionment in Republican Spain and my remorse for having taken part in creating it."

Perhaps the fortunes of the Second Republic and the above statements of Spanish republicans themselves (which could be multiplied tenfold) may give pause to many Americans of the 1940's who wished after World War II to see established in Spain a Third Republic. Wisdom can be learned from the facts of history; caution from past failures. The Spaniard, Alfred Mendizábel, declared in 1938: "One of the easiest things to do in Spain is to declare a republic, but one of the most difficult is to consolidate it."

## Polish Insurrection

(Continued from page eighty)

were deluded by the prospect of placing the Austrian Archduke Charles on the Polish throne. At the same time the Tsar was being informed by the Austrian government concerning the plans and the actions of the Poles.<sup>16</sup>

More candid was the attitude and action of Prussia. From the commencement of hostilities, the Prussian government had declared itself, not in a state of neutrality towards Poland, but merely in a state of inactivity. Prussia's desire for a quick suppression of the insurrection by her Russian ally was prompted by a fear of losing Posen and other Polish provinces should the Poles be successful.<sup>17</sup>

To prevent, as far as possible, Polish victory, Prussia did all in her power to aid the Russians and to hinder the Poles. Drastic measures were taken to prevent the passage of men and materiel from the Grand Duchy of Posen to the rebellious area. Polish troops crossing

<sup>16</sup> Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 473.

<sup>17</sup> Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. VI, c. 102. The Grand Duchy of Posen had been established at the Congress of Vienna (1815) and embraced the territory of western Poland which was held by Prussia. Cf. Cambridge History of Poland, pp. 257-274.

the frontier were disarmed and interned.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, large transports of provisions and ammunition were supplied to the Russian troops: Russian soldiers were permitted to pass through Prussian territory; Prussian officers fought in the Russian Army. When the Russian lines of communication in Western Poland were cut by the Poles and the Russian forces faced defeat through lack of supplies, neutral Prussia supplied the necessary materiel which enabled the Russian Army to operate in the West and eventually to inflict the decisive defeat of Ostrelenga.<sup>19</sup>

While actively aiding the Russians, Prussia was also drawing up plans contingent on Russia's defeat. It mobilized 51,000 men and 144 guns on the frontier of Poland for the purpose of occupying the entire north-west portion of the kingdom in the event of Polish victory. The contingency almost became a reality. In April, 1831, when the Poles had the advantage over the Russians and were apparently destined for victory, Nicholas agreed to cede the north-west portion of the Polish kingdom to Prussia.<sup>20</sup> But the battle of Ostrelenga occurred a short time later, and the fortunes of war changed. Russia proceeded on to victory, and the plans of Prussia were never carried into effect.

With Austria and Prussia actively aiding the Tsar, the Poles hoped for similar aid from outside sources. In truth, the leaders of the insurrection counted more on foreign aid for success than on their own efforts. All the powers had guaranteed the rights of the Polish kingdom at the Congress of Vienna,<sup>21</sup> and, since the Constitution of 1815 embodying these rights had been repeatedly violated by the Tsar, the Poles considered themselves justified in rebelling and in appealing to the Powers for aid. France and England, especially, were the objects of their entreaties.

France was the traditional friend of Poland, and much Polish blood had been shed in the campaigns of Napoleon. Moreover, Louis Philippe had ascended the throne by revolutionary means and was considered well-disposed toward a similar movement in Poland. The charge of the Polish exile, Captain Galecki, that French agents were sent to Poland to aid in stirring up the insurrection in order to divert attention from France, has already been noted.<sup>22</sup>

The French people were in complete sympathy with the Polish cause. Popular and official sentiment was overwhelmingly in favor of the Poles. The press unanimously urged the granting of aid to the Poles, and the halls of the Chamber of Deputies re-echoed with proposals for similar aid. Lafayette urged active intervention in favor of Poland on January 15, and March 18, when intervention would have meant success for the revolutionists. Louis Philippe himself addressed the Chamber of Deputies and expressed his sympathy and admiration for the Poles.<sup>23</sup> The Chamber of Deputies, in answer to the king, rejoiced "to hear the assurance which is dear to it, that the nationality of Poland shall

<sup>18</sup> Hordynski, *History of the Polish Revolution*, p. 359. Some supplies had been sent to Poland from England but were stopped in transit. Cf. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. VI, c. 102.

<sup>19</sup> Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. VI, c. 107.

<sup>20</sup> Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 473.

<sup>21</sup> Cambridge History of Poland, pp. 273-274.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. p. 4n.

not perish."<sup>24</sup> The people of France, the Chamber proclaimed, were almost as anxious for the independence of Poland as they were for their own.<sup>24</sup>

Besides the sentimental sympathy of the French people, there was also the very practical sympathy of the statesmen. In a dispatch to Sebastiani, Minister of Foreign Affairs in France, Talleyrand, then Ambassador to London, wrote on December 21, 1830, a month after the revolution began:

... Today that our voice has again assumed its importance in the councils of Europe, it must continue to be the same. I believe that, without disturbing the peace, it would be possible with the help of England and choosing well the moment, to offer our mediation and to turn the late events in Poland to the advantage of Europe. There is no one today who does not understand that the kingdom of Poland, strongly reconstituted would form the best barrier against the menacing advances of Russia. If we present well the means which would tend to obtain this result, and if England wishes to enter closely into our views, I think that there will be found in the Grand Duchy of Posen, in Galicia, in the Polish provinces of Russia, in Finland, perhaps also in Sweden and in Turkey, powerful means of action against Russia. It seems to me that it would be possible to reach the end, of which I speak to you, without war; the cabinet of St. Petersburg, well-counselled, would probably yield to the beat of well-measured steps.<sup>25</sup>

Thus the French were willing to intervene in behalf of the Poles, but they were unwilling to do so alone. They addressed themselves to England to concur with them in a joint remonstrance to the Tsar, to be followed by active aid if the remonstrance failed.

#### Hope for English Assistance

The Poles looked, therefore, with a hopeful eye to England which had so often countered the forces of reaction on the Continent. The Polish cause was popular among the people and in the press of England and elicited the sympathy of Palmerston and the Parliament. Officially, however, the government was averse to taking action. Lord Grey was too absorbed in the question of electoral reform to become entangled in Polish-Russian complications.<sup>26</sup> The Whigs and Tories were both, though for very different reasons, reluctant to press on the government an active pro-Polish policy.<sup>27</sup> Both were uneasy about the word "Revolution." The Tory party was fighting hard against all attempts at carrying into effect a reform of Parliament, and regarded every revolution on the Continent as something that was certain to become a new support to the Whig policies at home. The Whigs, despite their avowed sympathy with the Polish cause, hesitated to give voice to it in the House of Parliament for fear it might divert attention from their internal policy of parliamentary reform.<sup>28</sup>

England was, furthermore, unprepared for any active support to Poland. War was out of the question. This was the golden age of the economists; the government professed peace and reform. The Army and Navy estimates were diminished, ships were laid up, soldiers and

<sup>23</sup> Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. XII, c. 647.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., c. 647.

<sup>25</sup> G. Lacour-Gayet, "Talleyrand et l'Insurrection de la Pologne en 1830," in *La Pologne*, Paris, Association France-Pologne, 1930, 11e Annee, No. 12, Dec. 1, 1930, p. 964.

<sup>26</sup> Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 474.

<sup>27</sup> Herbert C. F. Bell, *Lord Palmerston*, London and New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1936, Vol. I, p. 166.

<sup>28</sup> Tadeusz Grzebieniowski, "The Polish Cause in England a Century Ago," in the *Slavonic and East European Review* (July, 1932), p. 82.

sailors were disbanded, and military and naval establishments were reduced.<sup>29</sup>

The official attitude of England toward the Polish cause was typified by Lord Palmerston. Privately his sympathy for the Poles was unreserved. But publicly his attitude was cold. He was governed by the traditional English policy of balance of power, and, in consequence, was of the opinion that France had to be curbed and the friendship of Russia preserved. France had threatened to enter the Netherlands in the Belgian crisis, and Palmerston believed that he might need Russia to hold a chauvinistic France in check. Nor had Palmerston any desire for Poland to be freed by the active help of France. Poland, as a natural ally of France, would then become "a French province upon the Vistula."<sup>30</sup> Palmerston was anxious to maintain good relations with Russia regardless of the outcome of the Polish insurrection.

It was while the Government was pursuing the policy of non-intervention and while the English people were manifesting their sympathy for the Poles that, on July 20, Talleyrand wrote to Palmerston asking for joint action. Talleyrand forwarded to Palmerston a letter written by Count Sebastiani which urged joint Anglo-French action:

Count Sebastiani to Prince Talleyrand  
Paris, July 7, 1831.

Mon Prince:

The King touched by the evils which the Polish war has already caused to two nations in which he takes so lively an interest, eager to ensure the maintenance of peace, compromised daily by so prolonged a contest, and no less engaged in preserving the West of Europe from the terrible scourge which this war entails, had addressed himself confidentially to the Emperor of Russia in order to put an end to so many disasters, and to bring to an end blood-shedding over which humanity has only too long groaned. The King's intention was also to preserve the political existence of a people which has showed itself so worthy of it by so great courage and patriotism, and which has the guarantee of the Treaties of Vienna for its nationality. Up to the present time the King's efforts have not achieved the results which he had the right to expect. Notwithstanding their small success, His Majesty does not consider it his duty to renounce the generous and pacific mediation which his personal feelings recommend, and which the conditions of Europe prescribes to him. He believes, especially, that were England to act in agreement with France, for giving to this salutary intervention all the force of which it is susceptible, the effect might be made certain by the combination of these two Powers. The King is sufficiently acquainted with the feelings which animate His Britannic Majesty to entertain the hope that he will not refuse to give his frank and complete adhesion to our advances, and to join his powerful action to our efforts, at a time when the question of the welfare of humanity and of the general interest of Europe transcends all others. The desire of His Majesty, mon Prince, is that you should make immediate and pressing overtures to the English Government with reference to this subject; we are awaiting their result with much impatience.

Accept, etc.  
Horace Sebastiani<sup>31</sup>

### *Britain Declines*

Two days after receipt of Talleyrand's letter with the above enclosure, Palmerston dispatched an answer to Talleyrand which presented the English policy toward intervention in Poland. Dated the 22nd of July, the

letter states:

... As far, therefore, as regards the desire of the French Government to secure to the Poles the national and political existence which it was one of the objects of the Treaty of Vienna to establish, the undersigned has to state, in the most distinct terms, that His Majesty could not see Poland deprived of the advantages of that arrangement; nor has the undersigned waited for the present communication from the Prince de Talleyrand to make such representations upon this point to the Russian cabinet as, without indicating any suspicion of the intentions of that Government, might prevent future misunderstanding.

The object of the communication which it is now proposed that France and England should jointly address to Russia, is an immediate cessation of hostilities, with a view to negotiations for the purpose of re-establishing peace between the contending parties by some lasting arrangement; and it appears from Count Sebastiani's despatch that a proposition to this effect has already been made to Russia by France, but hitherto without success.

If His Majesty had reason to think that the Emperor of Russia was disposed to avail himself of the good offices of the two Courts, and that their intervention might lead to an accommodation, His Majesty would willingly co-operate in a friendly endeavor to restore peace between Russia and Poland. But there are, on the contrary, too many reasons for fearing that a simple offer of mediation, so far from being desired by His Imperial Majesty, would, at the present moment, certainly be refused.

Can it then be expedient to make a proposal which there is no ground to hope would be accepted; and which, if refused, would leave to the two Governments the embarrassing alternative of either acquiescing in a determined rejection of their proposal, or of taking measures to enforce it by means of a more direct and effectual interference? The British Government certainly is not prepared to adopt the latter course. The effects and bearing of the contest upon the security of other States have not hitherto been such as to warrant measures of such description, nor has the conduct of Russia towards England been calculated to excite any unfriendly feeling; she has, on the contrary, performed towards this country all the offices of a good and faithful ally, and in the late difficult negotiations for the purpose of effecting a settlement between Belgium and Holland, she has acted with perfect fairness in her co-operation with the other four powers.

For these reasons His Majesty feels himself under the necessity of declining the proposal which the Prince de Talleyrand has been instructed to convey . . .<sup>32</sup>

Palmerston, thus, declined all mediation in behalf of Poland. He was mindful, as he wrote, of the co-operation which Russia gave in effecting a settlement between Belgium and Holland which prevented action by France. Palmerston believed in maintaining the power of Russia as a counterpoise to France.<sup>33</sup> It is perhaps significant that the above correspondence between France and England was not made public for thirty years. What effect the publication of the correspondence might have produced upon public opinion in England in 1831 is problematical.

Even the members of Parliament were unaware of any governmental action concerning Poland. The first mention of the Polish Revolution in the House of Commons was on August 8, 1831, when Mr. Hunt presented a petition from the Westminster Union in favor of the Poles.<sup>34</sup> It was very coldly received by Palmerston, and although very warmly seconded by other members, was negatived. On August 16, another amendment was introduced in the House of Commons by Colonel de Lacy Evans, but again Palmerston requested that it be negatived. Discussion manifesting the warmest sympathy for Poland followed on both occasions, but the wishes of Viscount Palmerston prevailed and the motions were not passed.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas MacKnight, *Thirty Years of Foreign Policy*, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1855, p. 171.

<sup>30</sup> Bell, *Lord Palmerston*, Vol. I, p. 166.

<sup>31</sup> Edmond Beales, *Poland, France and England, Extracts from State Papers*, London, pp. 7-8.

<sup>32</sup> Beales, *Poland, France and England, Extracts from State Papers*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>34</sup> Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. V, c. 930.

### *End of the Insurrection*

The time consumed in negotiating with the Western Powers proved disastrous to the insurrectionists. After the defeat of Ostrelenka the Polish general Skrzyniecki devised a daring plan of centralizing all the power of the Polish forces, and, by unexpected marches, to carry the battle into the heart of Russia. The French agents sent by Louis Philippe interfered, however, and by their promises of diplomatic protection succeeded in dissuading the leaders of the Polish government from putting the daring plan into execution.<sup>35</sup> The Polish government was induced to wait two months longer. That was the time necessary, the agents claimed, for completing the negotiations in the West. Prince Adam Czartoryski summed up the perilous position into which delay had placed Poland:

But we relied upon the magnanimity and the wisdom of the cabinets; trusting to them, we have not availed ourselves of all the resources which were at our command, both exterior and interior. To secure the approbation of the cabinets, we have never departed from the strictest moderation; by which moderation, indeed, we have paralyzed many of the efforts which might have saved us in those days. But for the promise of the cabinets, we should have been able to strike a blow, which perhaps would have been decisive. We thought that it was necessary to temporize, to leave nothing to chance—and we have at last seen the certainty, at the present day, that there is nothing but chance that can save us.<sup>36</sup>

Receiving no aid from the Western Powers, Poland was left to her own resources. General Paskevitch replaced Diebitsch and pressed on to victory. On September 8, 1831, after a two day attack, his forces entered Warsaw and the revolution was ended. Isolated bands of revolutionaries were systematically eliminated, and by the end of October the whole of Poland was again in the hands of Nicholas.

Only after the failure of the insurrection and in order to satisfy public opinion in France and England did the Governments in Paris and London make representations at St. Petersburg. These were of a general character and referred to the guarantees given by the Powers at the Congress of Vienna for the independence of the kingdom of Poland. Such belated representation, coming after the complete triumph of the Tsar, had little effect.

Nicholas now disregarded entirely the provisions of the Congress of Vienna concerning Poland. In September, 1831, an Interim Russian Government was established in Warsaw; and in February, 1832, Paskevitch was appointed Viceroy with unlimited powers to rule with the rank of Prince of Warsaw. In the place of the Constitution of 1815, which was abrogated, a new Organic Statute was promulgated, which contained a show of autonomy.<sup>37</sup> The statute proved to be a mere pretense, for its principal clauses of autonomy were never put into effect and remained a dead letter. In reality, the Polish Army was incorporated into the Russian Army; all electoral institutions were abolished; all higher educational establishments and all the leading government posts were filled by Russians; the Russian language was made compulsory in all higher administrative posts; a policy of oppression was introduced and the Russification of the country was carried out. Suppression of Polish

political and national independence became the policy of Russia in Poland.<sup>38</sup>

Thus ended the Polish Revolution of 1830. Having begun with high hopes of success, the revolutionaries saw their expected support fail to materialize. Their defeat was due in large extent to their own weaknesses: the rapid changes in the command of the army, the fierce party strife within the civil government of Warsaw, the outbreaks of mob violence in the capital at a critical moment of the war, and the apathy of the peasant class. All combined to prevent that unity of spirit and endeavor which was essential for success. Also responsible for the defeat of the Poles was the aid of Prussia and Austria to Russia on the one hand, and the failure of the Western Powers to respond to Polish appeals for aid on the other. Encouraged by the enthusiasm for the Polish cause in France and England, the revolutionaries expected material aid from those countries. When aid was not forthcoming, the movement was foredoomed to failure. With some justification could Mr. Cutlar Ferguson state in the House of Commons on April 18, 1832: "Poland was subdued, not by the arms of Russia, but by the promises of other powers."<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 474.

<sup>39</sup> Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XII, c. 648.

## Russian Revolution

(Continued from page seventy-six)

famous article in which he proclaimed the Soviets to be the heirs of Russian National History. Since this time, he has often repeated this idea until he went back to USSR after the liquidation of Russian control over the Manchurian Railway (1934). The Soviet regime expresses the Russian difference from the West. The apparent ultra-western October revolution is in reality the Russian protest against the West, the manifestation of Russian unity with the Asiatic world. The West did not take socialism seriously whereas its realization has been attempted in Russia. Socialism means control of economic and social life by a strong iron power. Therefore, the officially internationalist regime of the Bolsheviks is in reality doing a nationalist empire-building work. Ustrialow has accepted the collectivization of the peasants as well as the general plans because Russia needs concentration of power and energetic leadership. The whip, as Ustrialow has put it, in "Nashe Vremia" (Shanghai, 1934) counteracts the Russian love for limitless liberty, for endless discussions. Russia was never willing to accept domination from outside, but it always needed a strong discipline, imposed from within—a cruel self-imposed asceticism of voluntarily accepted domination.

I quote Ustrialow as a representative of the tendency to see the Revolution as a Russian event, as a force renewing and modernizing the Russian empire, giving it the opportunity to develop an activity for a supranational universal mission, cooperating with Asia in opposition to decadent capitalist Europe. Russian nationalists always claimed for Russia such a universal mission. I mention only Dostoyevski's speech on Pushkin in which he celebrated Russia just because she had, as he believed, a unique open-mindedness for all other

<sup>35</sup> Galecki, *Sketch of the History of Poland*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>36</sup> Hordynski, *History of the Polish Revolution*, p. 379.

<sup>37</sup> Hordynski, *Polish Revolution*, Appendix, p. 403.

peoples and civilizations. This interpretation of the Russian Revolution as an expression of particular characteristics of Russia's developments separating her from the West, goes back to Russian discussions in the 19th century. Then, the Slavophiles claimed for Russia a particular destiny due to her religious traditions. Today this claim is renewed in a strange combination with geopolitical arguments. The Westernism of the Bolsheviks is regarded as only externally accidental, as a means to increase the strength of the Eurasian empire.

Such nationalist interpretation was used, though not as consciously formulated as by Ustrialow, when in 1922, a group of Russian refugees (the most prominent of whom was Alexis Tolstoy) returned to Russia, changing their "landmarks". It has received an official recognition by calling Russia's war against Germany a patriotic war of national defense. The Soviet regime alone has strengthened Russia so that she could withstand a real attack. The Soviet regime put Russia in the service of universal ideals though other peoples did not accept them. It seems today impossible to distinguish between Russian nationalism and socialistic universalism. This universalism has become an aspect of Soviet national pride—the Soviet Union could do what other nations could not do and did not dare to do. Germany became even the victim of a barbaric social imperialism, in which a whole people, forgetting all class differences, tried to exploit other peoples as slaves. A manifestation of this Soviet nationalism occurred during a reception of the leaders of Russian emigration by the Soviet ambassador in Paris in 1944. The ambassador praised as eternal features of the Soviet regime, a Soviet patriotism, which binds all peoples of the USSR in an indissoluble solidarity; he also lauded the absence of private ownership of the means of production. He could have mentioned the one party rule which keeps everything in line and determines the permitted interpretation of Marxism and Patriotism.

#### *The Negative View*

But these beliefs in a positive meaning of the Russian Revolution, as it has been determined consciously or unconsciously by the Soviet regime, are opposed by negative, pessimistic interpretations.

A starting point for these is the democratic humanitarian criticism which often appears in formulations repeating the belief of Westerners in Russian acceptance of progressive and Western standards. The collapse of Tsarism opened the way for a normal development of Russia towards a liberal democratic regime, in the sense of a regime of freedom, based upon a really observed bill of rights and upon free discussion. But because of the backwardness of the Russian masses, a small group using demagogic appeals, could seize and maintain power. The Bolshevik regime is seen simply as a repetition of the bad features in Russian history at its worst: absence of respect for individual rights, belief in slave labor, existence of a tyrannic totalitarianism. This new Soviet totalitarianism has not abandoned dreams of world conquest, and today uses most skillfully elaborated, indirect methods exploiting the weakness of its future victims, the allies of today, and replac-

ing propaganda by pressure of Red Armies. Very impressive material is presented in support of this view. The hope of these social-democratic critiques is either a successful resistance from outside, or a revolt of the Soviet masses, or a revolt of the leaders of the Red Army, and the bureaucracy tired of the unbearable tension produced by the all embracing dictatorship. This democratic criticism is sometimes connected with a belief in peculiar Russian developments, a belief which differentiated the Narodniki (Populists) from the Marxists. The revolution was destined to liberate the peasants, but the peasants were its victims. The Bolsheviks deceived the peasants and then overpowered them. But this situation cannot last. Industrialization has not destroyed the potential power of the peasants. A kind of peasant democracy will rise.

This interpretation, liberated from its somewhat utilitarian ornaments and its somewhat pedestrian ideals, found a most profound expression in the writings of the poet Alexander Blok (1917-1918). Here the revolution appeared as an unavoidable judgment on Russian society which had become too much permeated by western materialism and utilitarianism, which was dominated—as the other great writer of this generation, Andrey Bely, has shown in his memoirs—by men without ideas, or by idyllic escapist who retired from reality, or by eccentrics who fled from reality into their fantastic private worlds. The Russian revolution was here seen as an elementary force, destructive and pitiless, brutal and barbaric, symbolized by the Twelve of Blok's poem, who go through the dark streets of Petrograd during the nights of 1917-18, shooting and killing, full of rage, despair and hope, whereas the bourgeois stands at the streetcorner with his dog which hides its tail between its legs. But Jesus Christ, invisible and inviolable, marches at the head of these strange new apostles.

Blok was soon disappointed: He no longer heard the melody of the revolving world when the bureaucracy rose again, when the revolution became more and more a terminological appeal, used from above for utilitarian purposes. But Blok saw, as also another Russian poet, Essennin, the Revolution as an explosion of the masses which for a short time could take revenge for their centuries-old sufferings and exploitations. Then the tragic development occurred: the masses changed masters. The dream of a world of unlimited freedom was only an expression of collapse and destruction after the apocalypse of the Tsarist regime. A new regime arose which was more brutal because it was less traditionalistic.

Similar to this Russian view, but more positive, is the western European view represented by Sorel's *Pour Lenin*. For Sorel, the Russian revolution is the creation of a myth which will overcome the plutocratic democracies without any beliefs. The world of capitalism is opposed by the world where labor dominates. The Russian revolution creates a new moral and productive social order. It must be noted that this view may easily evolve into sympathy for fascism and nazism. The communistic experiment is then denounced as having produced only a new kind of exploiters and bureaucratic parasites, who hate the real people, advance pseudo-

socialistic doctrines, and represent asiatic barbarism.

### *Socialism and Revolutionary Russia*

These various attempts to present the meaning of the Russian revolution—the doctrine of its leaders as well as the interpretations of enemies and of friends—show that the Russian revolution is an indissoluble but complex unity of particular Russian developments and universal issues. This is not surprising, for the mark distinguishing a real revolution from a violent change of regime or of personnel in power, is its claim of universal importance. But, on the other hand, the intensity of this claim is determined by its particular national and traditional background. The universal importance of the Russian revolution consists in its claim to realize socialism. Here the first attempt was made to set up a state in order to bring about socialism, whereas in the West, socialism had become a slogan of a movement for social criticism and reform inside the existing order, and did not dare to take its revolutionary program seriously. Despite all criticism and all disappointments, this socialistic claim has remained the decisive issue. No brutality, no defeat, and no counterpropaganda destroyed the impression that the Soviet regime represents something new, a socialistic regime, a proletarian regime, a regime of the masses. The fact that it lasted and that it overcame all difficulties and was successful in this war, defeated all opponents and all of the most competent critiques.

Timashoff has tried to show, with much interesting factual material, that pre-revolutionary Russia was undergoing a rapid industrialization, and that therefore the results of the Revolution would have been reached without terrible sacrifices. In this, he commits not only the error of believing that a development will always continue with the same speed and in the same direction; he also overlooks the fact that the old regime was too discredited, socially too insecure and too unbalanced to enjoy the same prestige as the new could obtain by appealing to a future not yet experienced. Belief in planning, consideration of masses, collectivism, social constructivism and engineering have been tremendously increased by the Russian revolution. It would be a most interesting field of study to investigate how these beliefs have worked to decompose moderate socialism and liberalism, how living under the shadow of communistic Russia has contributed to the rise and increase of political tensions, and has created an atmosphere in which compromises appear only as armistices and in which humanitarian beliefs are disregarded as ideologies and naivetes.

The Russian revolution provides vast material for the study and observation of the trends which characterize beginning, development and transformation of leading groups. Dostoyevski observed in *The Possessed* that the belief in unlimited liberty must result in the unlimited domination of those who believe that they know the way to this unlimited liberty. Thus he correctly stated the connection between utopian beliefs and tyrannies. He has also perceived the strange relation between an amoral use of all means and a power-hungry negation of moral and traditional values; and, a proof of his profundity, he has seen that this apparent cynicism hides,

as in the figure of Peter Verchovenski, a naive longing for a leadership beyond control and human limitation. The relation between utopianism and practical tactics appears during the Rusian revolution in impressive examples: Lenin unites marvelously a sincere belief in utopian aims and a most practical realism. Trotsky is the inflexible rationalistic utopian for whom the practice is identical with his power, and who is not cynical enough or too proud to overlook the working of the law of oligarchies—one oligarchy replaces another—among groups not under his leadership. Stalin is the realist who does not reflect about his utopia and whose realism has a coarse, cynical touch not found even in Lenin's inhuman actions. Here again, the universal influence would be a most important object of study: The fact that a small group could seize and maintain power over a gigantic empire has decisively influenced non-Russian and non-communistic movements. The Bolshevik background of Fascism and Nazism in this particular respect, cannot be denied by any objective student—despite all ideological differences.

But these universal aspects are grounded in peculiarities of Russian development. The Bolshevik revolution was the product and the deathknell of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, which was inclined to accept western ideas with a particular intensity, as Berdyaev has emphasized. Its victorious last representative and heir, Lenin, hated its lack of a sense for practical life, its humanitarian inclinations, its love of long discussions in order to avoid decisions. The revolutionary intelligentsia, disciplined and organized by Lenin, was able to give to the anarchic uprising of the masses, a firm leadership and impose upon them clear directions.

The Bolshevik revolution raises the problem of the peculiarity of the Russian development as a country between Europe and Asia, as a country with utmost differences in the development of the various social and national groups. The Bolshevik revolution was only made possible by the tradition of the Russian empire in which the government manipulated the masses in periods of crisis, disregarding human lives in the use of terror.

But this relation is modified by the Bolshevik regime, because it tries to be a mass regime under leadership of men coming from the masses. What are the peculiar causes of the lack of a sense of individual responsibility and citizenship in Russia? Are they to be found in the circumstances of the rise of Moscow under the Mongolian rule or in the Orthodox religion which does not favor active resistance to demands of the state? Or in the fact that Russia did not experience the Reformation? What are the relations of the various nationalities to the Soviet Union? Not only the backward people whose development was made possible by the policies of the Soviets, has to be considered, but also such a nation as the Ukrainian with a developed national consciousness.

Finally: What will be the relations of USSR to the world outside her? We have observed active hopes of a world revolution in which the Russian Soviets would not play the leading role, but transfer it to other more industrialized and technically more advanced countries. Then came a period of emphasis on internal development. But industrialization was at the same time militariza-

tion; Stalin emphasized that, not only in recent years, but even in the late twenties. Will expansionism reappear and carry multi-national bolshevism across Europe? Or will we enter a period of peaceful competition in which Russia will try to realize her aim of reaching and outdistancing the technical progress of the United States, as the late Bukharin proclaimed? Will Russia be able to exploit revolutionary situations, or is she too exhausted by the sacrifices of the last decades, and has she, therefore, become a conservative power longing for security and rest though sometimes using revolutionary

terminology and methods of infiltration? Will the Soviet leaders accept Russia's position in 1945 as the maximum which they can obtain, or will they try a policy of expansion, using Red armies and fifth columns, and calculating upon the pacifism and war weariness of other countries, particularly of the United States? The historian, student of the past, cannot answer these questions. The future will decide if the Soviet leaders will estimate correctly the power-relations in our time, or if they will be driven to adventures dominated by utopian expectations of a capitalistic collapse.

## Recent Books in Review

### European History

*The German Record, A Political Portrait*, by William Ebenstein. New York. Farrar and Rinehart. 1945. pp. ix + 334. \$3.00.

*Federalism and Regionalism in Germany, The Division of Prussia*, by Arnold Brecht. New York. Oxford University Press. 1945. pp. xvi + 202. \$2.50.

Those who want to enrich themselves at the expense of the German people and those who want their full vengeance for Nazi brutalities, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, do the same that Hitler did with the Jews, they cut off the honor of a whole people. It is unreasonable as it is unchristian to stir up emotions of this kind. Our hope to salvage from the war's moral devastation something good with which to renew and continue our Christian civilization rests upon the knowledge that there can be a return to God even for the most guilty human being. How absurd indeed to denounce Nazism as the result of the "German Record" and to forget completely the basic fact that the German nation had a most important share in the making of Christian civilization, and has presented mankind with some of the most sublime thoughts, some of the finest music and poetry and some discoveries of utmost importance for the evolution of social life.

William Ebenstein's book tells practically nothing of the positive side of the German record. He conceals the fact that there has been a highly cosmopolitan trend in German history, a desire for *weltbuergerertum* and *menschheitsziele*. The Germans have striven more ardently than any other nation after the assimilation of "world literature" by excellent translations and commentaries. Ebenstein's book is unscientific and biased in ignoring this positive half of the record. He presents only the story of German chauvinism, militarism, and reactionary politics. Ebenstein claims that "there is no place for religion in Prussianism," but that is not true; Prussia was not a totalitarian state in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as Ebenstein asserts (pp. 75 and 114). Religion and science had their autonomous life, and some Prussian kings, as for instance Frederic William IV, were deeply religious. It is true that skeptical Frederic II called himself a "pagan," but nevertheless it is silly to think therefore that he was a forerunner of Hitler; he was as tolerant as Hitler was intolerant.

If the authors of such books as Ebenstein's, instead of following the temptation of their anti-German resentment, would go deeper into comparative historical analysis, they would find that the recent epidemic of German chauvinism and ruthlessness might be at least partly explained by the fact that German national unity has not a sound tradition but was a latecomer in the history of the great European nations. At a time when England, France, Spain, and Russia had been for centuries powerful national states, Germany was still broken into very small states that fought each other, while the longing for a German state unifying all members of the people "as far as German tongue is heard" was a political dream with the boundlessness of dreams. The German state, created in 1871, was a confederation of princes, and, whatever its shortcomings, it was not at all a totalitarian state. When the princes were dethroned after the First World War, Germany, reduced in territory by the victors, became a federative republic with a constitution of the western democratic type. Only by a breach of the Weimar Con-

stitution were Franz von Papen in August, 1932, and Adolf Hitler in February, 1933 enabled to promote totalitarianism.

Though even larger percentages of Prussians than of other German citizens backed leftist parties, many German statesmen were convinced that the seventeen states federated in the Reich were insanely different in size, as can be seen by the fact that one state, Prussia, included three-fifths of the German population. Thus, liberal-minded Germans asked for *Reichsreform*, for the creation of new administrative units inside the Reich. Arnold Brecht gives a sound and scholarly documented history of those highly interesting, controversial problems. He discusses the defects in the Weimar federal system and the work of the Governmental Reform Committee (1928-1930). This part of the book is strongly recommended to any and every American administrator in Germany.

In the last part of his valuable study Brecht transgresses the limit of the historian to give his personal viewpoint of the problem of future democratic administration of Germany. He does not discuss, however, the possibilities of a permanent splitting of Germany or the fact that a great part of Prussia may be given to Poland. He proposes a rather conservative solution. Prussia ought not to be restored as a single unit, but its sections should become direct constituent units of Federal Germany.

Meanwhile, history has already surpassed the timid proposals of Brecht. The victors did not believe with Brecht, that the principles of federalism and regionalism should be decided by a popular assembly of the German nation. They have already started to create new units, some of them combining former Prussian provinces with smaller states. In the American zone of occupation, for instance, great parts of the former Prussian province of Hessen-Nassau were united with the state of Hesse—a very reasonable measure connecting Oberhessen, a territory of Hesse formerly surrounded by Prussian land, with the other territories of Hesse by an ex-Prussian land bridge. In the same trend of simplification of the German structure, the former Prussian "enclave" of Hohenzollern has become part of the state of Wuerttemberg. The victors will continue to press more radical ways of *Reichsreform* than the conservative-minded Germans.

The great question is, of course: shall the Reich be cut to pieces for ever as proposed now by the French, or shall the coherence of the Reich be preserved as advocated at present by American and British thinkers? The question of what to do with the Germans can not be isolated from the question: what will be Europe's future structure? If Europe is to become a federation of states, it may be wise to accept in this new structure several small German states instead of one, united Germany. But if Europe remains divided into national units, I do not see how the Allies can lure back the Germans into European solidarity without returning national self-determination to the "re-educated" Germans. Brecht does not consider the first possibility. But he explains very well the difficulties of separated German states in an unfederated Europe: "Nothing could be more detrimental to liberal trends in German reconstruction than a situation in which popular demand for national reunion would place democratic governments of separated Germanic states in the dilemma of having either to espouse or oppose such demands. If they should approve them and make them their own, this would bring them into conflict with the outside world. If they opposed the tendencies toward union, they would lose popular support and be replaced by undemocratic governments."

New York City

MAX FISCHER

**The Great Friend: Frederick Ozanam**, by A. P. Schimberg. Milwaukee. Bruce Publishing Company. 1946. pp. 344. \$2.50

This popular account of the great founder of the Saint Vincent de Paul Society makes an interesting addition to the long list of biographies about the French scholar. It will be especially interesting to youth.

Running through the carefully organized account of Ozanam's manifold activities is a reasonably satisfactory portrayal of his wonderfully lovable character. Scholarly and gentle, Ozanam won remarkable affection from the students who attended his lectures at the Sorbonne as well as from the poor for whom he worked.

Mr. Schimberg's attention centers largely upon Ozanam's greatest achievement, the establishment of the Saint Vincent de Paul Society. The original inspiration about the Society was his; the initial driving force was his; so were the zeal and charity which made the Society a success in seventeen countries of the world before the founder's death in 1853.

But Ozanam was a great scholar and teacher as well. He lived in an age of remarkable scientific and academic progress. Living in the midst of France's foremost scholars, he was easily a peer among them. His youthful studies had made him familiar with philosophy and religion. In Paris he mastered civil law and history. His association with the great scientist Ampere made him acquainted with advances in the physical sciences. He was a linguist who was familiar with a remarkably large number of languages. But his greatest achievement was in the field of comparative literature.

Although he began his studies in law at the University of Paris at his father's insistence and acquitted himself so admirably there that he was given a chair in law at the University of Lyons, his heart remained always in the field of literature. When an opportunity was given him to enter a competition for the chair of foreign literature at the Sorbonne, he set himself a grueling program of study. So successful was he that the professorship was given to him in preference to the seven other competitors.

Thereafter he brought to the Sorbonne one of the few lights of Catholic scholarship which brightened that institution during the irreligious years of the nineteenth century; for Ozanam was above all a Catholic.

For a long time he had thought earnestly of entering the Dominican order and studying for the priesthood. Eventually, upon the advice of a close friend, he decided to marry and to work for the vindication and growth of Christianity as a lay scholar. Those who read his writings or who are familiar with the work of the Saint Vincent de Paul Society will understand how thoroughly Catholic his ideas and work were.

But it was his life that was above all Catholic. The cause of his canonization has been introduced, and it may well be that by the centenary of his death he may be invoked as Blessed Frederick Ozanam.

*Institute of Social Order*

FRANCIS J. CORLEY, S.J.

## American History

**El Rio Del Espiritu Santo**, An Essay on the Cartography of the Gulf Coast and the Adjacent Territory during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, by Jean Delanglez, S.J., Ph.D. New York. The United States Catholic Historical Society. 1945. pp. xiii + 182.

The series of articles which Father Delanglez first published in the pages of *Mid-America* now appear between the covers of a book, edited by Thomas J. McMahon under the sponsorship of the United States Catholic Historical Society whose headquarters is in New York. As all who are students of the history of the French in America are well aware, Father Delanglez is generally recognized as one of the outstanding authorities in his field. This book again demonstrates his scholarship. In scope, Father Delanglez reviews the question of the River of the Holy Spirit, presenting evidence from the cartographical sources, the journals of the important expeditions and other sources of importance, in order to determine whether the Mississippi River and the Rio del Espiritu Santo be one and the same. He concludes, in his last chapter, that they are not identical rivers. For the historians of the area, the question posed by the book and its conclusions are both interesting and important. Hence a careful study of the subject such as the author presents will be

appreciated by many.

Readers who have only a general interest in the field which this book treats should be warned that they will not enjoy the monograph. The author assumes that his readers are well informed concerning the problem, the people, and the cartography of the subject. There is very little effort to explain or to identify persons who come into the story. In his introduction, the author plunges abruptly into his subject and never does he take the time to lay much of a groundwork for his study. For the specialist in the field, the approach has the advantage that he is served the principal course of the meal without the impedimenta of distracting side dishes. But, unfortunately for the general reader, the book remains dry, none too attractive and often times confusing.

Specialists in the field will offer one major criticism of the work. Cartographical studies require accompanying reproductions of many maps in order that one may follow the argument of the author. Father Delanglez has included only six reproductions. Undoubtedly, the very limited number of plates in the book may be due to the present situation in the publishing trade. It is most unfortunate that such should be the case, for, to the present reviewer, the absence of maps in much greater number than the book contains is clearly a detriment to the book. The popularity of the monograph will be judged by its usefulness, and its wide use is probably not to be expected due to the difficulty which even the well-informed reader will experience in following the careful study. This regrettable feature should in no way detract from the clearly excellent nature of the monograph itself. Father Delanglez has given us a solid study of a subject worthy of his ability.

*St. Louis University*

JOSEPH P. DONNELLY, S.J.

**The Perilous Fight**, by Neil H. Swanson. New York. Farrar and Rinehart. 1945. pp. xiii + 555. \$3.50

Mr. Swanson has written a colorful account of the war in which the British nearly reversed the decision of 1783. In this story we go along with the Army—that pitiful little army—untrained, unprovisioned, and in many cases unwilling, right from the afternoon of August 24, 1814, when it met and was defeated by the invading enemy at Bladensburg in Maryland to September 15, 1814, when Major General Samuel Smith sent word to James Monroe, Acting Secretary of War, that: "The enemy's vessels in the Patapsco are all under way going down the river."

Although the story is told in the popular manner, it contains a tremendous amount of information little known to the casual reader: the reasons for our unpreparedness; and, after the war had begun, the handicap under which our army labored because of the ineptitude of Secretary of War John Armstrong. The firearms of that day are described in great detail. The absorbing description of the Battle of Fort McHenry should be distributed to all the schools throughout the country so that teachers and youngsters may be as familiar with it as with the words of our national anthem. Truly has the objective of the author been fulfilled: "to place the birth of the national anthem in its actual setting . . ." We are told of the petty bickerings, the grabbing for profits, the hoarding, and even the black markets similar to those of the present day.

Sam Smith, the hero, is a wonderful sample of an eminently practical man, turned soldier, who has sufficient stamina and vision to see beyond the foibles and stupidities of dull politicians and by unselfish yet shrewd means to bring to successful completion a seeming disaster.

The maps on the end papers are most instructive for non-Marylanders (native Marylanders won't need to bother with them). In the text are several small plans by Frank Onken of the more important battle sites, and numerous illustrations by John G. Stees which point up each chapter. There are copious citations which some readers would prefer inserted in each chapter rather than at the end of the story. The big defect is the lack of a bibliography, especially since many valuable sources are cited in the notes. Because of the length of the descriptive subtitle, two pages instead of the customary one are needed to give the title and imprint information.

All in all *The Perilous Fight* proves educational, amusing in spots, and continuously enthralling.

*St. Louis University*

WILLIAM A. FITZGERALD

**Catholics and the Civil War**, by Rev. Benjamin J. Bled. Milwaukee. 1945. pp. 162. \$2.50

These ten essays on Catholics and the Civil War were intended, as the author states in the Preface, to help others who

wish to tell the story of the Civil War in detail. They do that!

The titles of the essays are "From Polk to Lincoln," "Catholicism and Abolition," "The Bishops of the North," "The Bishops of the South," "The Catholic Press," "Influencing Europe," "The Fenian Brotherhood," "Charity in the Armies," "Wisconsin Catholics," and "Mourning with the Nation." His bibliography is helpful, especially the references to scholarly articles.

The essay, "Catholicism and Abolition," one of the best in the book, gives the reader a fine impression of the balanced stand taken by the American Church. A surprising thing to note was the outspoken criticism by Catholics of non-Catholic abolitionist preachers in the essay on "The Catholic Press." From these early chapters one draws the opinion that many Catholic leaders thought the Civil War a 'needless war' brought on by fanatical abolitionists.

Now and then the writing is careless in structure or unity. The introduction of a brief discussion of sociology, for instance, served only to side-track the reader (page 23). An occasional remark, such as on page 20, would seem to credit French rationalistic philosophers with a bit too much influence on our Founding Fathers.

College teachers will find in *Catholics and the Civil War* useful, pre-digested material for their American history classes. For high school teachers, it offers good background reading.

*St. Louis University*

W. B. FAHERTY, S.J.

## Social Science

*The State in Catholic Thought*, by Heinrich A. Rommen, LL.D. St. Louis. B. Herder Book Co. 1945. pp. viii + 747. \$6.00

Professor Rommen has produced an altogether admirable treatise in political philosophy. It is not merely the comprehensiveness and thoroughness of the book that makes it so valuable—it is divided into four parts: Philosophical Foundations, The Philosophy of the State, Church and State, and the Community of Nations. What gives the book its chief merit is the emphasis throughout upon the relation of practical to speculative science—an emphasis long over-due among Catholics but not among Marxists. Moral rectitude depends upon speculative rectification because we must know the nature of man and of the end in practical activity. The direction of political philosophy is thus closely related to the direction of the natural sciences. Dr. Rommen does not discuss the implications for political philosophy of the revolutions that have taken place in the natural sciences, but his presentation of the consequences of the separation of the ontological order from the moral order strikes at the root of all contemporary political thinking. Since the material universe is the result of God's practical knowledge, the investigations of modern experimental science into the nature of that universe find it to be something "formable" and not simply "given"; thus experimental physics, operating properly in its own line, curiously abets the philosophical position that man cannot even know that there are natures. In that event man creates his own universe and his own moral order.

Some students will feel that Dr. Rommen is not quite fair to Aristotle. The charge of "ethical socialism" does not seem warranted if we consider that Aristotle first presented, against Plato, the conception of political authority as first in the *ordo rerum humanarum*, and distinguished the spheres of the individual, the family, and cultural and economic organizations. (*Ethics*, I.) And it was Aristotle who furnished the arguments against that most typical mark of totalitarianism, namely, the subordination of science to the state. Under no circumstances can the state "regulate" the true and the false, since matters of science depend on "the nature of things" and not upon human will. St. Thomas carefully presents Aristotle's thought on this point.

The translation theory of the origin of political authority seems curiously like Duguit's theory of social solidarity. Social solidarity gets away from positivism, but approaches what Professor Rommen calls a "utilitarian indicative of conformist behavior." It is hard to see how the translation theory succeeds in achieving anything else despite its noticeably defensive appeal to the norm of natural law and common good. Granted that authority is originally in the community and that the community's consent (implicit or explicit) is necessary before government can be just, it still remains true that it is not consent of any kind that gives government its just authority, but a rectified consent. Thus the consent itself supposes a rectitude that is at the basis of the political prudence by which the individual gives his consent to authority that rules justly and humanely for the common good. It is not clear that the original absolute equality and freedom of men under primary natural

law implies that immediate (non-representative) democracy is the only government established by natural law, as Dr. Rommen, following Suarez, suggests. Rather it would seem to be the case that no government is established by primary natural law, but rather a disposition toward government; this disposition on the part of the reason issues, by way of the reason considering a thing by comparing it with what results from it, in the proximate equality which the ruler-subject relationship establishes as necessary for the common good. It is because it is proper to the reason to consider things by comparing them with what results from them that man is said by Aristotle to be more of a social animal than other animals.

All the main problems of political philosophy are treated by Dr. Rommen—treated carefully and searching. Although his treatise is not a history of political philosophy a truer insight into that history is to be gained from a reading of Dr. Rommen's work than will be gained from reading a score of extant "histories" of political thought.

*St. Louis University*

CHARLES N. R. MCCOY

*Freedom Under Planning*, by Barbara Wooton. Chapel Hill. The University of North Carolina Press. 1945. pp. vii + 180. \$2.00

It was just about a year ago that Professor Hayek emerged rather suddenly from the academic seclusion of the London School of Economics to become the darling of American conservatives. It can be said without any injustice to this distinguished Austrian-born economist that he didn't pull himself up by his own bootstraps. He was catapulted into fame and presumably into some degree of fortune almost overnight by certain groups in the United States who were sufficiently interested in his thesis to distribute copies of the *Road to Serfdom* gratis in those circles where they thought that it would do the most good.

This is merely by way of deplored the fact that *Freedom Under Planning*, which is an effective and almost word-for-word rebuttal of the Hayek thesis, is virtually unknown to the general public. In spite of the enthusiastic approval of several distinguished economists, Miss Wooton's courteous rejoinder hasn't stirred up one one-hundredth of the interest that greeted Hayek's manifesto in the salons and libraries of the country. More's the pity, for the Hayek point of view, if it gains a foothold, cannot but postpone and make more difficult the reconstruction of American economic life along more sensible and more Christian lines.

The reviewer can say this the more gracefully inasmuch as he finds himself standing—tentatively and uncertainly—midway between the two extremes which are represented by Professor Hayek and Miss Wooton respectively.

Stripped of all its plumage, the Hayek thesis boils down to the proposition that there's no such thing as a little economic planning. It's either all or nothing. Hayek comes perilously close to forfeiting his acknowledged reputation for scholarship by his tortuous efforts to equate economic planning as such with Socialism and by his very uncritical and unscientific analysis of the origins of Nazism and Fascism. There's more to the *Road to Serfdom*, of course, than this—but, given even the most sympathetic interpretation, the book adds up to nothing more significant than a popular restatement of semi-classical economics. The reviewer is not alone in suggesting that semi-classical economics, however attractively presented, is pretty thin stuff in a world which hasn't any time to lose in finding an effective substitute with which to counter the widespread challenge of collectivism.

It's difficult to classify Miss Wooton. She isn't a Socialist in the accepted sense of the word. Suffice it to say that, while she shares many of Hayek's fears about the totalitarian encroachments of modern governments, she finds it possible to reconcile her fears and misgivings with the espousal of democratic economic planning. Her courtesy towards Hayek and her willingness to concede a point wherever possible is something more than feminine. Regardless of the essential merits of her extended reply to Hayek, one cannot but concede that her general approach to this crucial and complicated problem of freedom versus planning is ever so much more calm and objective and scholarly than is the more popular and over-simplified approach of her distinguished opponent.

Miss Wooton has effectively refuted some of the more exaggerated over-simplifications of Hayek, but she hasn't quite reconciled freedom and planning—or at least not to the satisfaction of the reviewer. If Hayek is too fearful of planning, Miss Wooton probably isn't fearful enough. It is suggested that both parties to this debate—a debate which will continue beyond our lifetime—could profit from a careful analysis of *Quadragesimo Anno*. This neglected document seems to call on the one hand

for more economic planning than Hayek can currently stomach and on the other for less centralization of this planning than Miss Wooton appears to favor. Perhaps the major fallacy of both the semi-classical economists and the economic planners is a failure to reckon with the organic nature of economic life and to appreciate fully the essential purpose and function of the natural economic groups in society.

National Catholic Welfare Conference

GEORGE G. HIGGINS

**The Liberal Tradition**, by William Aylott Orton. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1945. pp. xiv + 317. \$3.50

This is an amazing book. Any attempt to rescue "The Liberal Tradition" from the odium of its nineteenth century faults and its twentieth century debacle would constitute a major intellectual feat. It should be remembered that Professor Orton is an economist. He belongs to that group of economists who regard Adam Smith, John Locke, and others of their ilk, as proponents of a pure gospel of economics and politics whom the world has rejected only at great peril to its material salvation. He regrets that Herbert Hoover's economics were so little appreciated, and he does not fail to approve of Hayek and Fromm. He discovers in Jean Bodin, foremost of the *Politiques*, a "precursor of modern liberalism"—a discovery startling in all its implications for the student of political theory. Yet so difficult of interpretation is Bodin that the particular conclusions one might draw from his theory would depend largely upon which part of the *Six Books of the Republic* one chose to emphasize. It comes, however, as a surprise to learn that "they (the *Politiques*) were the truer idealists for spurning the wild horses of dogma and absolutism (sic) and keeping their feet on the ground." What Jesuit and Dominican Monarchomachi of the period would have replied to such an assertion might be a little surprising to Professor Orton. To Bellarmine, Suarez, Vittoria, and Mariana, Bodin and his followers would have represented absolutism (with or without divine right) as pure and unadulterated as the sixteenth century offered. If one is looking for an exemplary expounder of natural law in this particular period, Bodin is hardly first choice: his statements regarding the doctrine are confused and equivocal, and one may easily find other authorities of far greater clarity and conviction. As Professor Allen says of Bodin's writings: "There is vast book-learning, vast confusion . . ."

Professor Orton shows much appreciation of Catholic teaching, tradition and influences. He seemingly regrets the religious revolution of the sixteenth century. Some of the finest passages in the book refer to the beneficent influence of Catholic thought. In fact his admiration for the Catholic approach leads him to associate it with that which is closest to his heart—"true" liberalism. True as it is that Catholic teaching on the worth and dignity of the individual and the reserved sphere of the state may find ready acceptance and approval in certain phases of liberal thought, yet there still exists a wide gulf between the thinking of laissez-faire bourgeois individualists ever since Adam Smith on the one hand, and the implications of the teachings of St. Thomas on property and the functions of the state on the other. There is no sanction in Catholic teaching for regarding the operation of politics and government as a necessary evil. And that is the inference which one always draws from economic liberals, whether they be in Professor Orton's class, or whether they be Catholic economists caught in the toils of a modern capitalistic materialism.

Professor Orton, like certain other economists, is slightly naive on the subject of politics. Everything performed by a breed known as "politicians" is *ipso facto* wrong. A world left to the economists to run would be far better, that is, if we exclude Maynard Keynes and Sir William Beveridge. One cannot escape the feeling that Professor Orton has fallen into a current and altogether unscientific, altogether unrealistic conception of the statesman, the governor, the politician, if you will, and all who assume the rather thankless task of running the state. The politician seeks the best practical compromise between conflicting views. He does not occupy the comfortable seat of the teacher who knows exactly the right theory and who cannot see why everyone should not at once embrace the whole truth. In the larger sense the economist deals with things; the politician deals with people endowed with all kinds of convictions, hopes, fears, and aspirations. The use of the term politician or politics, as certain economists and business men employ it, as a term of opprobrium, smacks of a kind of commonplace journalism which indulges in exaggeration and tends to bring all government and authority into disrepute.

How does Professor Orton propose to apply the principles

of liberalism in the present confused state of the world? He advocates voluntary cooperation in several world-wide functional organizations—groups of scientists, groups of artists, groups of scholars of various kinds, and business groups. Business and industrial cartels he believes to be natural, inevitable, and altogether salutary.

However much one may disagree with portions of this text, it must be conceded that the subject matter is presented in a lively and brilliant style. It is a work that may not be altogether ignored by social scientists.

The University of Chicago

JEROME G. KERWIN

**Contemporary Foreign Governments**, by Col. Herman Beukema, Maj. Wm. M. Geer and Associates. New York. Rinehart & Co. 1946. pp. xxi + 362. \$3.50

According to its own foreword, the volume here under review represents an attempt to present in "condensed" form, a "survey" of the political institutions of those foreign nations which until recently were classed as major powers. Included in this category are Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, the U.S.S.R. and Japan. A final chapter, headed "Toward World Security," offers a cursory view of the development of the movement toward international cooperation, culminating in an outline of the United Nations Organization.

The book has evidently been designed as a textbook for a very abbreviated course in the major foreign governments. As a matter of fact, the statement is made specifically that the scope and coverage of the book have been limited to the time made available to the cadets of the United States Military Academy by their curriculum. Since the authors represent the Department of Economics, Government, and History at West Point, it may be presumed that the limitations above set out as to scope and coverage are closely related to the course offering at the Military Academy.

It might be interesting to speculate as to the length and breadth of the course for which *Major Foreign Governments* has been designed. Admittedly, it would have to be a "survey" course. For example, the whole subject of the government of Great Britain is covered in fifty-five pages, three of which are devoted to the armed forces organization, and eight to British foreign policy since Versailles. The authors justify the "attention given to the power factor in politics, one which has been too long ignored in standard texts in the field of foreign governments," on the basis of the fact that the book is to be used by the cadets at West Point. Yet very little attention, in fact, seems to have been given to this factor.

One definite advantage can be ascribed to the book. It is the fact that the changes wrought since 1939 in the political structure of France, Italy, Germany, and Japan are described and analyzed, though in very cursory fashion. For the rest, a mere summary of the material found in the older, more extensive texts in the field of foreign governments is offered.

A good bibliography is appended, and the volume has an excellent index. Since it represents the first attempt to bring major foreign governments up to date in textbook form, it will doubtless enjoy, and it deserves to enjoy, at least for the time being, a relatively widespread popularity.

St. Louis University

PAUL G. STEINBICKER

## Book Notice

Formed in May, 1945, the Burke Society of Fordham University, named after the political philosopher Edmund Burke, has published the first in a series of co-operative studies and monographs (*A Symposium on Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America*, edited by William J. Schlaerth, S.J., New York. Fordham University Press. 1945.) Dr. Ross J. S. Hoffman, Chairman of the Burke Society, states the purpose of its founding: ". . . to place a new emphasis on the study of political society and the art of statecraft."

Drawn from the faculties of History, Political Philosophy, and the Social Sciences of the Fordham Graduate School, the members of the Burke Society discuss in the monograph de Tocqueville's classic work. The subjects chosen deal with some phase of American democracy as presented by de Tocqueville, or some analysis of de Tocqueville himself and his work. Contributors to the monograph are: Ross J. S. Hoffman, Mario Einaudi, Robert C. Hartnett, S.J., Moorhouse F. X. Millar, S.J., A. Paul Levack, and Nicholas Timasheff. In the light of their special significance for our times, the several papers are certain to be useful and profitable for students of history and political philosophy.

# Headlining the CROFTS History List

Faulkner

## AMERICAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY

4th Edition, 838 pages, \$4.00

Benns

## EUROPE SINCE 1914: In Its World Setting

6th Edition, 672 + 92 pages, \$4.00

Bailey

## A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

3rd Edition, 934 pages, \$4.25

Boak, Hyma, Slosson:

## THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

Complete in one volume, 488 + 638 pages, \$5.00; in two volumes, each \$3.10

For further information, or examination copies, write to

F. S. CROFTS &amp; CO.

101 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, N. Y.

# ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY

ST. LOUIS 3, MISSOURI

*Includes the following Schools and Colleges and Affiliated Institutions***CONSTITUENT SCHOOLS**

College of Arts and Sciences.....	221 North Grand Blvd.
College of Arts and Sciences at Florissant.....	Florissant, Mo.
Graduate School.....	15 North Grand Blvd.
University College.....	15 North Grand Blvd.
School of Divinity.....	St. Mary's College, St. Marys, Kansas
School of Medicine.....	1402 South Grand Blvd.
School of Law.....	3642 Lindell Blvd.
School of Philosophy and Science.....	3633 West Pine
School of Dentistry.....	3556 Caroline Street
School of Commerce and Finance.....	3674 Lindell Blvd.
School of Nursing.....	1325 South Grand Blvd.
School of Social Service.....	221 North Grand Blvd.
Institute of Social Science.....	3674 Lindell Blvd.
Institute of Geophysical Technology.....	3621 Olive St.
Labor School.....	3674 Lindell Blvd.
Physical Education.....	3672 W. Pine Blvd.
Gymnasium.....	3672 W. Pine Blvd.
Auditorium.....	3642 Lindell Blvd.
Radio Station W-E-W.....	3642 Lindell Blvd.
Walsh Memorial Stadium.....	5200 Oakland Blvd.

**THE CORPORATE COLLEGES**

Fontbonne College.....	Wydown and Big Bend Blvds.
Maryville College.....	Meramec and Nebraska Avenues
Webster College.....	Lockwood Blvd., Webster Groves, Missouri
Notre Dame Junior College.....	Ripa Avenue, South Saint Louis
Saint Mary's Junior College.....	O'Fallon, Missouri

**THE HOSPITALS**

1. UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS	
(a) St. Mary's Hospital.....	6420 Clayton Rd.
(b) Firmin Desloge Hospital.....	1325 South Grand Blvd.
(c) Mt. St. Rose Sanatorium.....	9101 South Broadway

**2. AFFILIATED HOSPITALS**

(a) Alexian Brothers' Hospital.....	3933 South Broadway
(b) St. Anthony's Hospital.....	Grand Blvd. and Chippewa
(c) St. John's Hospital.....	307 South Euclid Avenue

**3. STAFF-RELATED HOSPITALS**

(a) St. Mary's Infirmary.....	1536 Papin Street
(b) St. Louis City Hospital, Unit I.....	1515 Lafayette Ave.
(c) Homer G. Phillips Hospital.....	2601 Whittier
(d) St. Louis City Sanitarium.....	5300 Arsenal Street
(e) St. Louis Isolation Hospital.....	5600 Arsenal Street

**AFFILIATED NURSING SCHOOLS**

(a) Alexian Brothers' Hospital School of Nursing.....	3933 South Broadway
(b) St. John's Hospital School of Nursing.....	307 S. Euclid Ave.

**THE OUT-PATIENT SERVICES**

1. THE UNIVERSITY OUT-PATIENT DEPARTMENT	
Firmin Desloge Hospital.....	1315 South Grand Boulevard

**2. THE ASSOCIATED OUT-PATIENT DEPARTMENTS**

(a) Alexian Brothers' Dispensary.....	3933 South Broadway
(b) St. John's Dispensary.....	4945 Audubon Avenue

**THE STAFF-RELATED OUT-PATIENT DEPARTMENTS**

(a) City Dispensary.....	1515 Lafayette Avenue
(b) The Obstetric Dispensaries	
St. Louis Obstetrical Hospital Association	
St. Ann's Foundling Asylum	
(c) The Pre-Natal Clinics	
The Cass Avenue Clinic	
The Bethesda Dispensary	

**WHITE HOUSE**

St. Louis House of Retreats—  
White House, Box 484, Route 9, Lemay P. O., Mo.